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Public Interest Influences in Competition Law – A Comparative Analysis of South 
Africa and Germany 
A. Introduction 
Public interest influences and policies play a role in almost every country with 
competition law legislation. However, the systematic position of public interest 
considerations and the extent of practical influences differ.  
South Africa and Germany stand exemplary for these differences. In both jurisdictions 
there are recent debates on how much weight should be given to public interest factors, 
particularly employment. In South Africa, the recent merger case of Walmart/Massmart 
decided in 2011 gave rise to further discussions and in Germany there is a still pending 
application for ministerial authorisation (‘Ministererlaubnis’) for the 
EDEKA/Tengelmann merger1.  Due to the historical development and the systematic 
relevance of public interest factors in both countries, the number of cases involving 
public interest considerations differs noticeably between South Africa and Germany.  
In South Africa, where the public interest test is a mandatory part of a merger review 
there is a variety of cases in which the Commission is trying to weigh the negative 
competitive effects against public gains. And it has become increasingly important over 
the last four to five years. 
Whereas in Germany, where public interest considerations lie outside the general 
merger review and are only taken into consideration on application by the parties, there 
are no more than 222 cases since 1973 containing such deliberations.   
This thesis will start by representing the legal framework of competition law, in 
particular merger control, in Germany and especially evaluating the case law and the 
question of balancing, arising from § 42 I ARC in more detail. I will then look at the 
cases of ministerial authorisation applications in Germany examining the most 
important public interest grounds and how they were weighted against restraints of 
competition. Afterwards, I will turn to South African competition law and examine the 
same questions specifically looking at the public interest test. I will then go on to 
compare and present in detail in which ways the systems and legal practice differ and 
provide a brief outlook of the future of public interest influences in the competition 
regimes. In the end I will point out the advantages and disadvantages of each system 
and whether this leads to the conclusion that legislation or practice in these jurisdictions 
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should change in the future.  The final findings will try to provide a recommendation on 
how balancing should be used to come to fair and satisfactory results in future merger 
cases and sum up the possible influence of the South African model on other merger 
regimes.  
B. Public interest influences in Germany 
Public interest aspects do not play a role in the merger control under the German 
competition law unless a party applies for a ministerial authorisation as described in § 
42 ARC which allows the Minister of the BMWi (Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology) to consider non-competition aspects. 
I. Main elements of German competition law 
Germany has one of the most developed competition law regimes in the world. It is laid 
down in the Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC). Its aim is to protect 
competition within the Federal Republic of Germany.3 After coming into effect in 1958 
it has been updated via numerous amendments. The amendment in 1973 encompassed 
the introduction of a national merger control regime long before it was introduced at 
European Community (EC) level in 1989. Since then, merger control plays an 
increasingly vital role in competition practice in Germany with 1,188 notified 
concentrations in 20144. The provisions governing merger control today, which I will 
focus on for the research purposes of this thesis, are §§ 35 ff ARC (Chapter Seven on 
the Control of Concentrations). The purpose of the control described in Chapter Seven 
is primarily market structure control. The generally pro-competitive external corporate 
growth through mergers can lead to anti-competitive market powers and is therefore 
controlled by a preventive system of prohibition subject to authorisation.5  
In most parts it is equivalent to Art 101 ff Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) at the EU level. Through the EU legislation German merger control lost 
some of its weight. The European Commission functions as a one stop shop for mergers 
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with community wide dimension generally6 excluding national review on these cases 
(See § 35 III ARC, Art 21 Section 3 Subsection 1 EC Merger Regulation respectively).7  
Where there is no EC competence, mergers can be subject to review by the BKartA 
(Federal Cartel Office). Pursuant to § 35 I ARC, it is therefore generally necessary that 
the merging parties meet certain thresholds consisting of a worldwide (EUR 500 
million) and national turnover (EUR 25 million respectively 5 million) as cumulative 
requirements.   
In the case of national competence for the matter, the competition test described in §§ 
36-41 ARC has to be applied. First, § 37 ARC describes the different variants of a 
concentration. If the concentration leads to a significant impediment to effective 
competition, especially through the creation or strengthening of a dominant position as 
required in § 36 I ARC, the BKartA will prohibit the proposed merger according to § 40 
ARC. The analysis applied for the impediment to competition involves a double 
hypothetical assessment comparing the hypothetical competitive relationships in the 
future with and without the concentration.8 First, the BKartA looks at the market 
structure and asks whether the presumptive example of the creation or strengthening of 
a dominant position is applicable. If it is not, the competition authority goes on 
evaluating the restraint of effective competition pursuant to the SIEC-test (‘significant 
impediment of effective competition’).9 When examining the fulfilment of one of the 
alternatives, the BKartA needs to apply an overall view including all relevant factors - 
but the analysis by the BKartA is strictly restricted to negative and positive competition 
aspects.10  
Although the EC Merger Regulations are purely concerned with competition aspects11 
there are several European Member States with national competition regimes which 
include the additional possibility to allow a merger on non-competition grounds. 12  
In Germany, § 42 ARC provides for the possibility of a ministerial authorisation of 
mergers which previously have been prohibited13 by the BKartA. With this § 42 I ARC 
splits the responsibility in merger cases between the Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology and the Federal Cartel Office. § 42 ARC turns the merger control in 
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 Upon application, the Commission is able to relegate cases to the national competition authorities, see 
Art 4 paragraphs 4, Art 9 EC Merger Regulation; furthermore, big mergers can stay in competence of the 
BKartA pursuant to the two-thirds rule in Art 1 II, III EC Merger Regulation.  
7
 The German merger control therefore only takes effect where the merger does not meet the 
thresholds of Art 1 EC Merger Regulation, cases of non-controlling minority stakes and partial-function 
joint ventures. 
8
 Thomas op cit (n5), § 36 Rn 13. 
9
 Ibid Rn 16. 
10
 Ibid Rn 24-25. 
11
 Only ‘exception’ is the efficiency defence in Art 2 I b) ECMR. 
12
 Thomas op cit (n5) §42 Rn 12. 
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Germany – in case of application by one of the parties – into a two-step procedure. 
First, the BKartA examines the merger in line with the provisions of §§ 35 – 41 ARC 
and rules a decision on the merger. If it prohibits the merger (or issues a winding-up 
order)14, the parties are left with the ultimate possibility to make an application to the 
Minister for authorisation of the merger.  
II. The ministerial authorisation in detail 
In order to be granted a ministerial authorisation the formal and substantial 
requirements must be met. 
1. Formal requirements 
The formal requirements for a ministerial authorisation especially include the 
application for authorisation after the prohibition or winding-up order by the BKartA, 
see § 42 I 1 ARC (principle of ‘ne ultra petita’).  Corresponding to § 54 II No. 4 ARC, 
the application can also be made by the seller within the respite of one month.  
Importantly, § 42 IV 2 ARC requires the Minister to consult the monopolies 
commission for an expert opinion. Just like the Minister, the monopolies commission is 
bound by the findings of the BKartA on the competition impacts in terms of § 36 I 
ARC.15 The right of the higher regional state authority to deliver an expert opinion as 
laid down in § 42 IV 2 ARC is of less practical importance. The expert opinions have 
no legally binding effect on the Minister.16 Furthermore, § 56 II 3, sub clause 1 ARC 
provides for a public oral hearing by the BMWi. The final decision-making competence 
lies materially with the BMWi and functionally with the Minister17 who has to deliver 
his decision within four months after the application (see § 42 IV ARC). 
2. Substantive requirements  
The law on the substantive requirements appears to be very clear and simple, if you 
look at it superficially in the first place. § 42 I ARC is structured in a way that it first 
provides for two groups of cases in which a ministerial authorisation might be granted 
(sentence one), points out a specific factor to consider when deciding whether a specific 
case fulfils one of the before mentioned categories (sentence two) and lays down a 
condition under which the possibility of an authorisation is excluded (sentence three).   
What makes the application of the law difficult is the imprecise wording and the 
subsequent problems of interpreting the law when dealing with undefined legal terms. 
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 Thomas op cit (n5) §42 Rn 10: the legislator assumes that a winding-up order can be issued without a 
prior prohibition of the merger although this in practice will only happen in conjunction with a 
suspensory condition. 
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 Ibid Rn 38; for more detail on the binding effect see B,II,3,b. 
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 Bechthold, § 42 Rn 18. 
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For the first alternative these include the interpretation of ‘advantages to the economy as 
a whole’ as well as ‘outweighed’ and for alternative two ‘overriding public interest’ and 
‘justified’.   
While ‘outweighed’ and ‘justified’ are only concerned with the degree of advantages or 
extent of the overriding public interest, it is first to ask what the meaning of the 
undefined  terms described in § 42 I 1 ARC is, what it entails and which cases fall under 
the two alternatives. 
a. Alternative one - advantages to the economy as a whole 
For logical reasons it is better to examine ‘advantages to the economy as a whole’ first 
when looking at the two terms. The reason being is that although a clear distinction 
cannot be made, the first alternative is to be seen as a subcategory of the second 
alternative specifying on economic aspects.18 
The wording of the law speaks of ‘advantages’ which can generally include any positive 
effects. A restriction is made through adding the requirement that these advantages have 
to be advantages ‘to the economy as a whole’. It is therefore primarily concerned with 
the economic advantages of the concentration. ‘To the economy as a whole’ stands in 
contrast to individual economic advantages which cannot constitute a reason for 
ministerial authorisation.19 This excludes especially effects only20 beneficial for the 
concentrating or third parties and calls for broader grounds for justification.21 It does not 
contradict the wording of the statute that under special circumstances also merely 
regional effects can trigger advantages to the economy as a whole.22 The same applies 
to advantages to single economic sectors.23 It is therefore clear that ‘as a whole’ cannot 
be interpreted as advantage to every participant involved in the economic life.24 This 
would lead to an extensive narrowing of the scope of application making it impossible 
to meet the requirements. In conclusion, for the advantages to fulfil the requirements, 
the direct effects can possibly be narrow as long as it ultimately brings economic 
advantages to the German economy as a whole.    
Indications of what these economic advantages might be in concrete terms can be drawn 
from the systematic of the regulation itself. Following § 42 I 2 ARC it is explicitly 
required to take into account25 considerations concerning the competitiveness of the 
participating undertakings in markets outside the scope of application of the ARC. In 
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 Richter op cit (n2) Rn 135. 
19
 Cf Begründung Reg.-Entwurf 1971, page 31. 
20
 Veba/BP, page 507: it is not detrimental if the macroeconomic advantage matches with economic 
benefits of the merging entities. 
21
 Cf Universitätsklinikum Greifswald page 692. 
22
 Ibid page 693. 
23
 Loewenheim/Meessen/Riesenkampff/Riesenkampff/Lehr, GWB 42 Rn 5. 
24
 Cf Ibid Rn 6. 
25





particular terms, this means that authorisation can be granted on grounds of preservation 
or improvement of international competitiveness of German firms on foreign markets 
(see B, III, 3).26  
Looking into the explanatory memorandum of § 24 III ARC (old version), today’s § 42 
I ARC, the economic goals of a stable price level, high employment rate, external 
equilibrium and continued and balanced growth have to be taken into consideration 
when applying the regulation.27 Therefore, economic advantages based in these fields 
are generally suitable for a ministerial authorisation. Moreover, based on the intent of 
the legislator it is necessary that these advantages have at least a medium-term effect.28  
In addition, the advantages described above need to ‘follow from the concentration’. 
The concentration must be the cause of the advantages weighed against the restraint of 
competition.29 Although systematically referring to alternative one, the requirement of a 
causal link must logically also apply to overriding public interests. Nevertheless, there 
is no indication of a requirement that the merging firms need to intentionally promote 
the advantages.  
b. Alternative two – overriding public interest 
The second alternative requires an overriding of public interest. As I stated before, this 
term is wider than and cannot be strictly separated from alternative one.  
Again, the wording - ‘public interest’ - can be interpreted in a very broad sense and is 
only restricted by the adjective ‘overriding’ which calls for a certain qualitative element. 
From its original meaning an interest is something which has great importance or is 
very useful for something or someone. Someone in the case of ‘public interest’ is the 
public as the entirety of people in Germany. Hence, interpreting the plain wording, the 
term is of seemingly ‘infinite extensibility’30. Even when including ‘overriding’ in the 
meaning of exceeding someone or something comparable in importance, the wording is 
not precise enough to apply the regulation in a concrete and distinct manner.   
To narrow the scope of the term it is therefore useful to take a look at the legislator’s 
intention. Because there is no clear differentiation between the alternatives, the 
explanatory memorandum also does not differ by demanding for a general political, 
economic or socio-political justification.31 Nevertheless, economic justification grounds 
can be assigned to alternative one so that public interests stand for the political and 
socio-political considerations. Through the second alternative it was intended to give 
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 Lehr op cit (n23) Rn 8. 
27
 Begründung Reg.-Entwurf 1971, page 31. 
28
 VEBA/Gelsenberg; differentiating between the alternatives with a stricter requirement of permanent 
effect for advantages to the economy as a whole, Thomas op cit (n5) Rn 84. 
29
 Kallfaß op cit (n25) Rn 2; Bechtold § 42 Rn 8. 
30
 Ibid Rn 5. 
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the Minister the right to take appropriate considerations into account, which lie outside 
the economic scope. Important factors for the interpretation are general policy decisions 
and statements of the Federal Government (‘Bundesregierung’) which lay down the 
guidelines for the desired economic and general development in Germany.32 In addition, 
it is also necessary to note the general developments of the economic order and public 
morals.33 
In the Universitätsklinikum Greifswald case, the Minister lists social, educational, 
research, regional and health policies as possible justifications.34 Further exemplary 
grounds for justification stem from the legal, ethical, cultural, defence policy, 
environmental or social field.35 This widespread range of public interest grounds shows 
that there is no comprehensive ‘case law’ that specifies certain narrow interest factors 
capable for ministerial authorisation grounds but rather there are many different factors 
having the possibility to serve as overriding public interest. One can even think of other 
potential public interests far off economic considerations like health, justice and 
freedom.36 These often very different grounds are difficult to compare and make it hard 
to find a general guideline for orientation.   
The adjective ‘overriding’ is supposed to restrain the public interest grounds to cases of 
great significance.37  
3. The central question of balancing competition aspects against political 
policy goals 
Parties will only make an application for ministerial authorisation if the concentration 
has positive effects of which at least they are convinced will trump the negative 
competition restraints. Therefore, possible positive and negative effects of a merger 
have to be evaluated and, if necessary, balanced against each other in the case of a § 42 
ARC application.  
Assessing at which point one set of interests has to be given priority to the detriment of 
concurring interests is a central question not only in competition law but runs through 
all fields of law which are based on and need to conform with the Constitution 
(‘Grundgesetz’ or ‘GG’) and its basic principles.  
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 Kallfaß op cit (n25) Rn 5. 
33
 Thomas op cit (n5) Rn 89. 
34
 Universitätsklinikum Greifswald page 692. 
35
 C.f. Thomas op cit (n5) Rn 89; Richter op cit (n2) Rn 136. 
36
 Basedow page 417. 
37
 Begruendung Reg.-Entwurf 1971, page 31: “are of great significance in the individual case“; differing 





a. Constitutional necessity for proportionality within the merger control 
Before looking at the complexity of balancing itself - especially in view of § 42 I ARC - 
it is important to understand why and how fundamental values and the proportionality 
rule can also be of influence to the result of balancing in the merger review context. 
Balancing and proportionality are fundamental ground rules laid down in the 
Constitution in Article 20 III derived from the rule of law and therefore governing the 
ordinary law in general including the ARC. The state is not allowed to intervene into the 
rights of the citizens without sufficient justification. In that sense, Art 20 III GG 
prohibits the state to intervene in an extensive manner (‘Übermaßverbot’). Therefore, 
the state action lacks a sufficient justification where the interests were not balanced in 
the right way achieving proportionality between the different values in conflict 
(practical concordance). Constitutional concerns are invoked especially when the state 
prohibits an individual from exercising his freedom but also in cases where the 
admission to one individual interferes with the freedom of another individual. 
Therefore, in the merger control context this constitutional limit not only has impact on 
the application of § 42 ARC, but can in extreme cases already hinder the BKartA from 
prohibiting the merger pursuant to § 36 I ARC. 
The concentration control pursuant to § 36 I ARC interferes with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in Art 12, 14 and 2 I of the Constitution, especially the entrepreneurial 
freedom and the right to property which include the guarantee of freedom to merge with 
other companies. The basic legal capacity of a legal person follows from Art 19 III of 
the Constitution.38 The legitimate purpose of § 36 I ARC is to prevent the creation or 
strengthening of market-dominating positions and the protection of the free market 
conditions. Where the requirements of § 36 I ARC are fulfilled, it generally does not 
raise further proportionality concerns. 
The ministerial authorisation in terms of § 42 I ARC shall be granted if the restraint of 
competition is outweighed by advantages to the economy as a whole following from the 
concentration, or if the concentration is justified by an overriding public interest. Such 
an approval pursuant to § 42 ARC interferes with the rights of third parties, especially 
competitors of the merging parties and is therefore also subject to the constitutional 
principle of proportionality.39  
In the same manner as the prohibition of a merger, the granting or denial of 
authorisation has to be suitable, necessary and proportionate. The ministerial 
authorisation is suitable to promote the objective of public-interest benefits if it 
contributes to the realisation of the objective or makes it more likely.40Approval is not 
                                                           
38
 BeckOK GG, Art 19 Rn 34 
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 Thomas op cit (n5) § 42 Rn 117. 
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necessary if an alternative purchaser exists and a merger in this case would not trigger a 
prohibition pursuant to § 36 I ARC41 or if there is no causal link between the 
concentration and the benefits which makes it indispensable.42  Proportionality in its 
narrow sense is the final and central question of proportionality considerations.  For 
this reason, it needs to be examined in some detail as follows. 
b. Proportionality through balancing in accordance with the constitution 
State measures are proportionate when a balancing of all circumstances leads to the 
result that the objective pursued is not disproportionate in relation to the degree of 
seriousness of the infringement.   
aa. General aspects 
Weighting of different interests and concerns is a pivotal part of law making and law 
finding43. Balancing is characterised by the fact that the decision is to be made in view 
of the peculiarities of the case at hand.44 Nevertheless, balancing has to be as transparent 
and reviewable as possible and cannot be seen as a magic tool in the hand of the final 
decision-making body.45 Therefore, certain measurements have to be applied to make 
the decision-making process comprehensibly rational. 
The decision authority needs to follow the basic principles of logic. Furthermore, the 
decision body always needs to include all aspects which are available and came to his 
knowledge and weigh them according to common measurement policies such as the 
different weight and importance of constitutional rights (eg absolute protection of life in 
Art 2 II 1 GG or importance of freedom of speech and freedom of the press as well as 
freedom of assembly as democracy constituting constitutional rights arising from Art 5 I 
and Art 8 I GG). Another fundamental rule is not to include extraneous considerations 
in the assessment.  
Although, executive authorities have great discretion when the decision involves 
valuations and prognoses, balancing always needs to be in conformity with the 
fundamental principles just described.  
Before balancing it is important to specifically name the legal interests which are in 
question in the particular case. Afterwards, one needs to describe their general 
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 Universitätsklinikum Greifswald page 685; see also Lehr op cit (n23) Rn 9; differing view that a less 
harmful merger does not hinder the entitlement to a ministerial authorisation Richter op cit (n2) Rn 138 
and agreeing for the case that the less harmful alternative has no chance of implementation Thomas op 
cit (n5) § 42 Rn 120. 
42
 Thomas op cit (n5) § 42 Rn 120. 
43
 C.f. Thyssen/Hüller, page 668 “principle of proportinonality […] is of overwhelming importance in 
administrative law”. 
44
 Gassner, page 119. 
45





importance before examining the weight they should be given in the case at hand. 
Ultimately, these considerations shall then determine the outcome of the balancing. 
bb. Balancing in terms of § 42 I ARC 
On the face of the law, there are competition restraints on the one side. ‘Restraints of 
competition’ in the sense of § 42 I 1 ARC primarily means the findings of the BKartA 
on impediments to effective competition upon the application of § 36 I ARC.46  
The underlying purpose of prohibiting, respectively not authorising an intended merger 
is always to protect the market. The abstract importance of a functioning competition 
market free from any impediments is very high. Not only does it serve the main purpose 
to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as an institution but in fact 
ultimately also prevents harm from consumers.47 In addition, the purpose of merger 
control in Germany to protect market participants as well as competition itself as an 
institution is a complementary partner of private autonomy.48 Functioning markets are 
of fundamental importance to a society and economy as a whole. The weight of the net 
welfare loss49 which results from the concentration of market power can be immense. 
Of course, this general assumption always has to be seen in the light of circumstances of 
the particular case. 
This brings up the question if and to what extent the Minister is already bound by the 
findings of the BKartA. Generally, the two-step system with the clear distinction 
between the competition analysis of the BKartA and the outside competition 
considerations by the Minister implement that he cannot review the decision of the 
BKartA and is bound by its underlying factual and legal findings.50 Nevertheless, the 
Minister is also subject to constitutional obligations arising from Art 20 III of the 
Constitution (‘executive authority […] bound by law and statute’) so that exceptions 
have to made in the case of evidently implausible, speculative or contradictory 
findings51 by the BKartA. Furthermore, the Minister has the power to decide upon the 
significance of the restraint of competition at due discretion52 and can undertake his 
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 Bechtold, op cit (n29) Rn 7. 
47
 Thomas op cit (n5) Vorbem § 35 Rn 4-5, where he states that the introduction of the SIEC test leads to 
an increasing consideration of effects on consumers. 
48
 Ibid Rn 4. 
49
 Net welfare loss or deadweight loss is the result of monopolies which can possibly lead to too much or 
too little production and consumption of a good or resource. 
50
 C.f. Lehr op cit (n23) Rn 92-3. 
51
 Thomas op cit (n5) § 42 Rn 75; for legal review in case of implausible findings see already 
Daimler/MBB page 956; differing view Bechtold, op cit (n29) Rn 5, who states that the Minister should 
be able to freely review the findings of the BKartA. 
52





own additional investigations53. For weighing the competition effects, the Minister is 
also allowed to include eventual competition advantages in his considerations.54 
When determining the significance of the market dominance, the Minister has to include 
all resources of the merging parties in his considerations, including but not limited to 
the financial capacity, access to the procurement and sales markets and interconnections 
with other companies as well as legal and factual barriers for the market access of other 
companies.55 Facts, which arose after the decision of the BKartA logically also need to 
be included in the evaluation of the Minister.56 
Restraints of competition are evaluated by the market impact, the extent and the 
probability of occurrence.57 Not only the additional anti-competitive effects but also the 
degree of the restraint of competition in total has to be taken into consideration which is 
especially important for markets with dominant firms pre-merger.58 In more detail, it is 
thereby necessary to evaluate the effects on the competitors, products and innovations 
within the market.59 Socio-politically negative effects of a merger cannot be included in 
the assessment.60 
The weight on the other side of the balance consists of one or more public interest gains 
in the form of advantages to the economy as a whole or overriding public interest as 
described above (see B, II, 2, a-b). Essentially, this part is concerned with finding a 
partial compliance of the commercial interest to merge and public interests.61 
The diversification of possible public interest gains makes it hard to evaluate an abstract 
importance. For the first alternative, the wording ‘to the economy as a whole’ shows 
that these grounds need to have some weight and that benefits for the economy ideally 
lead to gains for everyone within the society. The second alternative can relate to legally 
protected rights of varying importance (cf the Holtzbrinck merger case: freedom of the 
press and press diversity as matter of enormous importance). In that sense, for the 
evaluation of the positive effects one needs to look at the weight, the duration of the 
gains outside of competition and the competitive advantages of the concentration.62 
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If the negative and positive non-competitive effects of the merger lead to an ultimately 
positive balance in terms of one of the two alternative requirements63, these have to be 
weighed against the negative effects on competition.64 
As a starting point it always has to be kept in mind that protecting competition is the 
rule and the ministerial authorisation only an exception to it (see § 42 I 1 ARC ‘in a 
specific case’).65 All of the factors which need to be considered on the one or the other 
side stand in relative relation to each other so that the weight of the advantages needed 
to equalize the competitive disadvantages is oriented at the severeness of the restraint of 
competition.66 An absolute grade of relevance is not necessary.67 It is questionable 
which level of advantage is necessary for a ministerial authorisation. An ‘offsetting’ 
(better than the official translation of ‘outweigh’) and therefore the absence of a 
negative balance should be sufficient – in contrast to the requirement to ‘outweigh the 
disadvantages’ in § 36 I ARC.68  
Although the Minister is left with a wide discretion in interpreting, he has to primarily 
orientate towards the fundamental commercial policies.69 Furthermore, it has to be kept 
in mind that merger are generally permanent and not reversible. Therefore, the 
advantages also need to be permanent in order to qualify for an authorisation.70  
He uses qualitative and quantitative consideration factors to determine the effects on 
competition, especially: volume of the market, economic importance of the markets and 
degree of effects on the market structure. In addition, potential disadvantages to the 
economy as a whole or impediments to overriding public interest have to be taken into 
consideration.71 From a qualitative perspective it can be said that: the bigger the scope 
for the residual competition from a macroeconomic perspective, the smaller the degree 
of restraint of competition.72 But the decisive factor is the quantitative weight of the 
restraint. It can be drawn from the volume of the affected markets, market shares and 
market share advantage in comparison to other competitors.73 The quantitative criteria is 
not to be determined by the relation between the domestic and foreign market to not 
advantage big international firms.74 
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On the face of the law, § 42 I ARC requires not more than a balancing of the two 
contradicting sets described above by looking at the time and probability of occurrence, 
geographical scope and content of the restraint of competition on the one hand and 
common welfare grounds on the other hand.75    
But in the sense of a comprehensive constitutional evaluation of the cases, all 
competing interests have to be taken into account. Thereby, the different interests; 
namely the interest of the parties to a proposed concentration to merge, the public 
interest to achieve the biggest economic benefit possible and the interest of third parties 
to maintain functioning competition need to be brought in balance (triad of interests).76 
Aside from these theoretical guidelines, the crucial underlying problem of balancing 
these factors against each other is that they are not directly comparable. A comparison 
requires that the subject matters to be compared have at least one feature in common. It 
might be possible to find these factors in certain constellations when opposing the § 36 
ARC results and economic advantages pursuant to alternative one of § 42 I ARC.77 
Nevertheless, this element called ‘tertium comparationis’ is certainly non-discernible 
when trying to balance overriding public interests with disadvantages to competition.78 
This is the root cause for difficulties in § 42 ARC cases. It makes the decision-finding 
very complex and hard to review and therefore often times also subject to criticism. 
Although there are various economic models which have developed over the years of 
competition practice and try to capture the effects on the markets, the concentration 
effect are difficult to determine. In Germany, this led to the introduction of the SIEC-
test79 through the 7th Amendment to the ARC shifting away from a purely market 
structural approach to an effects-based approach. This is consistent with the general 
trend to increasingly use economic methods in competition law (‘more economic 
approach’). Based on the assumption of a reliable economic evaluation as to the effect 
of a concentration, the most straightforward solution to the balancing problem would be 
to also evaluate the advantages on an economic level.  But lacking reliable tests and 
empirical factors or numbers with which economic gains of future public interest 
advantages can be described – at least where they are not direct economic gains – this 
approach is challenging if not impossible to pursue for the Minister. Of great 
importance in the ministerial authorisation considerations today is the employment 
factor. Consequently, the questions in this context are: what value can be attributed to a 
certain number of jobs, what influences their value and finally, how can this be 
compared and balanced against competition restraints. Some of these questions are 
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reflected in the cases brought before the Minister. Therefore, it is worth taking a closer 
look at the public interest concerns that have been raised and how the Minster dealt with 
the complexity of balancing in the past practice.      
III. Case studies 
The law itself in § 42 I ARC makes clear that the decisions always have to be made 
based on a case-by-case analysis. For further specification, it is therefore pivotal to look 
at the case practice to get a sense of the conditions under which the exemption of the 
ministerial authorisation can be granted.  
Considering the introduction of the ministerial authorisation over 40 years ago, there 
has been a fairly little number of applications. Furthermore, the prospect of success 
seems to be rather moderate with seven authorisations in total out of which only three 
have been granted without further obligations so far.  
The decision practice encompasses evaluations on a number of different common 
welfare considerations. It is the object of this chapter to show the range of public 
interest grounds falling under one of the two alternatives and which are capable of 
weighing up the competition restraints in the sense of § 42 I ARC and to demonstrate in 
excerpts how the factors are balanced against each other in the individual cases. I will 
thereby focus on grounds for approval which can also be found in the centre of 
discussion in South Africa with regard to the public interest test, in particular the 
justifications including employment effects. 
1. Job retention 
As described above (B, II, 2, b) the common welfare considerations in § 42 I ARC can 
be specified by general policy goals. The national objective of macroeconomic 
equilibrium is laid down in Art 109 II GG and sub-constitutionally put into concrete 
terms by the ‘Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft’ 
(StabG). § 1 StabG speaks of a high level of employment and makes full employment to 
a policy goal which needs to be considered when evaluating § 42 I ARC grounds.80  
a. Babcock/Artos 
Babcock/Artos was the first case brought to the BMWi for authorisation on grounds of 
job preservation. Noticeably, like other early decisions it deals with a merger which had 
already been put into effect81 and in the end led to a ministerial authorisation subject to 
conditions.   
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In this decision, it was made clear that job retention plays an important role, especially 
in economically underdeveloped regions.82 At this early stage, the Minister already 
clarified that a misuse of the argument needs to be prevented keeping in mind that 
experience shows that concentrations almost always are aimed at rationalisation effects 
including the cutting of jobs83. Hence, there are high standards of proof to be applied 
when parties claim that not allowing the merger in question would lead to permanent 
job losses, especially if the concentration has already been implemented.84 Another 
finding in this case is that an increased risk of job loss in other firms is only to be put in 
the balance if it is caused by the merger and its resulting structural changes on the 
market.85 
In contrast to the monopolies commission who speaks of a more than remote degree of 
restraint of competition, the Minister stresses that the volume of the market was just 
above, by now clearly below the statutory threshold.86  It is without doubt that the 
company would have exited the market without the concentration and therefore all jobs 
would have been lost which stands in comparison to the job cutting of 650 people that 
actually happened after the merger.87 
In combination with two obligations imposed, the Minister came to the result that the 
negative competition restraints are outweighed and in the end authorised the 
concentration.  
b. Thyssen/Hüller 
In Thyssen/Hüller, the Minister responds more precisely to the question of the degree 
which job preservations must have in order to be considered a sufficient non-
competitive gain. It is stated that § 42 I ARC calls for a macroeconomic consideration 
which is to be seen different from the preservation from jobs in single companies.88 In 
addition, the decision requests to take into account that the preservation of jobs might 
conflict with the competitiveness of the German economy and therefore in the end 
might bear the risk of even greater job losses.89  
Following experience, it is also found that there is a market deterrent effect beyond the 
direct effect of the concentration. Because in cases like this, with large companies 
entering a market of predominantly small and medium-sized firms, these former 
competitors try to look for a potent partner, which is ultimately leading to further 
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restraints of competition.90 Furthermore, a strong demand side is not capable of 
lessening the deterrent effect to a great extent, also because it is based on vague 
assessments of future market behaviour.91  
Examined more closely, it can be stated that the case primarily dealt with the 
preservation of know-how and international competitiveness which according to the 
Minister only could be reached through the job preservation keeping the team of highly 
specialized experts together. Job preservation itself was not the focus because the 
majority of experts who would have lost their jobs most probably would have found a 
new job within a short period of time.92  
c. IBH/Wibau 
The negative effects on the market in this case are evaluated to be low. The reason 
behind it is that the volume of the market is just above the de minimis threshold, tends 
to stagnate and production stemming from this market is mostly sold on export markets 
with stronger competition.93  
Again, it is referred to the usual concepts of mergers claiming that at least in the long 
term mergers are aimed at a systematic and gradual job cutting.94 Additionally, looking 
at the economy as a whole, it is also emphasized that the negative impacts on 
competition might adversely and ultimately lead to negative effects on secured jobs in 
other companies.95 
Nevertheless, in this case the Minister deviated from some earlier general assumptions 
stating that it is likely that jobs will be preserved on the long term or even be increased 
and the strong export orientation of the market makes it unlikely that jobs of other 
competitors in the German market will be at risk.96 Furthermore, it has been 
acknowledged that the common welfare ground of job preservation and the employment 
policy goal plays an increased role in times of high unemployment.97   
Again, the job preservation argument was not the predominant argument for allowing 
the merger in this case. Although only the two arguments brought forward together led 
to the ministerial authorisation, the decisive factor was the international competitiveness 
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which as a consequence had the additional positive effect of job preservation and 
creation.98 
d. Kali + Salz/PCS 
The parties in this case bring forward that an authorisation should be granted because 
the merger would have the effect of significantly improving the international 
competitiveness of K + S GmbH and preserving jobs. 
The parties were not able to prove that there are positive effects rooting from the merger 
that outweigh the restraining effect of the concentration. The special finding in this case 
was that in the end, the perpetuation of internationally uncompetitive structures 
endangers jobs which could have been upheld in the case of necessary adjustment 
measures.99 In addition, the general rule that concentrations regularly lead to higher job 
losses than maintaining the single firms in the competition was applied once again.100  
In this case, the merging entities failed to prove that there is a causal link between the 
concentration and a lessening of risk for the competitiveness of the firm and ultimately 
securing of jobs. Following, the case is dismissed for a reason making the evaluation of 
the weight of this possible common welfare ground unnecessary and therefore does not 
entail new specific findings on the balancing of competition restraints against job 
preservation.  
e. E.ON/Ruhrgas 
A peculiarity in this case lies in the fact that E.ON and Ruhrgas are not competitors and 
the decision is therefore concerned with a vertical concentration.101 It caught massive 
public attention because the Minister authorized the merger against the findings of the 
experts’ report of the monopolies commission.102 
The quantitative weight of the restraint of competition is significant because of the 
turnovers and market volumes; for the qualitative weight it was differentiated between 
the markets concluding that there is a relatively significant restraint of the market for 
gas.103  
The findings in this case promote that there has to be a strict differentiation between 
positive effects on the job market which are due to the concentration and those which 
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are merely a consequence of the general demand growth and increase of the market. It is 
stated that the positive effects are more likely to be attributed to the latter.104   
Again, the argument of job preservation already failed at the stage of sufficient proof of 
positive effects linked to the merger. The authorisation was then based on extensive 
obligations reducing the detrimental effect of the concentration on the markets and 
advantages linked to the merger in the form of international competitiveness and 
security of supply (see B, III, 3).  
f. Holtzbrinck/Berliner Verlag (special report by the monopolies commission)
Important findings on the handling of the job retention argument can also be found in 
the special report by the monopolies commission with regard to the 
Holtzbrinck/Berliner Verlag merger. A decision by the Minister is not available because 
the parties withdrew the application for a ministerial authorisation after the publication 
of the special report. 
These findings include that job preservation can be better achieved through global 
employment policies so that the ministerial authorisation shall remain a subsidiary 
instrument and that a cyclical unemployment is not a sufficient ground where it is due to 
special regional structural long-term underdevelopment.105   
g. EDEKA/Tengelmann
In contrast to most of the other cases, job preservation is the central question in this 
application for ministerial authorisation.   
Following the monopolies commission - considering the market volumes and turnovers 
- the restraints of competition on the procurement and sales market is significant. The
counter argument of the preservation of 5,700 jobs is not able to outweigh these
negative effects. The reasons for this are that there is no sufficient evidence of the long-
term preservation of jobs and the fact that there are many alternative interested parties
willing to buy Tengelmann branches. Also, the argument that competitors will be under
pressure after the merger which might lead to possible job losses weighs against the
approval of the concentration.
Nevertheless, the Minister decided - in contrast to the recommendation given by the 
monopolies commission - that the parties can put the concentration into effect if certain 
widespread conditions are obtained.106 Foremost, these conditions include collective 
labour agreements securing the long-term preservation of jobs.    
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With this - different from earlier decisions - the Minister did not merely dismiss vague 
promises of job preservation through expected future growth (at the expense of 
competitors) but showed the parties a list of conditions of how to make the job 
preservation argument concrete enough and the merger accessible for permission.    
h. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, job preservation can under special circumstances function as a common 
welfare ground and lead to a ministerial authorisation. Nevertheless, it is rarely used as 
a single argument because it is intertwined with several other factors like rescue 
mergers and especially international competitiveness. In the case history job 
preservation was seen as either a means to the end of international competitiveness 
(Thyssen/Hüller) or as a mere positive extra side effect which comes along with the 
international competitiveness of a firm (IBH/Wibau; Kali+Salz/PCS). After the 
Babcock/Artos decision which dealt predominantly with job retention, the recent 
EDEKA/Tengelmann merger is the first case concentrating on this specific common 
welfare ground again. Decisions where the parties brought up the argument of job 
preservation are often concerned not with the weight of the preservation and how it has 
to be balanced against competition considerations but rather with the proof of a causal 
link and effective long-term preservation of jobs per se. Often times, the overall positive 
effect of the merger on the job market itself is put into question by looking at possible 
job losses, eg in other firms (Babcock/Artos; EDEKA/Tengelmann), the merging firm 
(Kali+Salz/PCS) or the German economy in general (Thyssen/Hüller) resulting from the 
concentration. This also reflects the accurate concept of looking at the difference of jobs 
lost in case of finally prohibiting the merger in contrast to jobs lost after allowing the 
merger from a macroeconomic perspective instead of only looking at the direct effect on 
job loss in the merging firms without the merger. The tendency in the ministerial 
practice to assume that merger are generally aimed at rationalisation and in connection 
with that at cutting jobs in the long run can be seen critical. Prima facie, it looks like 
merging companies are put under general suspicion of not upholding the promises made 
to be granted a ministerial authorisation. This seems to contradict the obligation of the 
Minister to decide every single case dependant on its own specific facts and 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the Minister has to face practical realities and can 
therefore refer to general experience. The application of that assumption is therefore a 
valid method used by the Minister. The argument for high standards of proof being that 
the parties to critical mergers almost always bring forward the job preservation 
argument107 is from my point of view not convincing. The mere fact that the argument 
is often used does not say anything about the likelihood of it being invalid.  
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But the overall sceptical and restrictive policy towards authorisations on job 
preservation grounds, especially through the use of high standards of proof, secures that 
the relationship between the rule and the exception in terms of § 42 ARC is maintained.    
The crucial and central aspect of proving the long-term preservation of jobs could be 
simplified by using an obligation which prohibits the firms from cutting jobs for a 
certain period of time. But in Germany the Minister is not allowed to order such an 
obligation. This is due to the general prohibition of continued long-term monitoring 
which only allows for conditions and obligations containing structural measures, see § 
42 II 2 in connection with § 40 III 2 ARC (for more details, see D, III). 108  
2. Rationalisation benefits
Rationalisation benefits are the most important driver of economic growth.109 They can 
be categorised as advantages to the economy as a whole if the internal cost-savings 
cause a certain production to use less production factors or the same amount of factor 
input to generate a higher product volume.110   
Like the requirement in the case of job retention, it is necessary that the effects occur 
with sufficient probability.111 The Minister declared that rationalisation benefits can 
only be used very cautious as ground for ministerial approval.112 Microeconomic 
benefits can be categorized as rationalisation benefits in the sense of § 42 I ARC if they 
are of extraordinary significance, especially in connection with the introduction of new 
production methods or new technologies.113 Nevertheless, when evaluating the 
rationalisation benefits, it is to be kept in mind that a trickle-down effect to new 
innovation, jobs and customers can only be secured through functioning competition on 
the market.114 Although the Minister does not elaborate on the rationalisation benefits in 
Kali+Salz/PCS, it can be drawn from the decision that purely business advantages for 
the companies are not enough to be seen as a common welfare ground.115 
Overall, rationalisation benefits have never been used as the main argument for 
approval. They are generally allocated to the area of merging firms. Transferring them 
to advantages to the economy as a whole is connected with a huge burden. This seems 
to be legitimate because although they are an important variable in economic growth, 
the strengthening of single firms through rationalised work efficiencies also leads to 
further market power and intensifies the negative structural effects of the merger. 
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3. International competitiveness
First of all, the successful business activity of German companies on markets outside 
Germany itself has positive effects on their specific business. But there are many factors 
linked to the success of ‘national champions’ that have a positive effect on other fields. 
Therefore, the legislator expressively introduced in § 42 I 2 ARC that ‘the 
competitiveness of the participating undertakings in markets outside [Germany] shall 
also be taken into account’. 
Whereas, in IBH/Wibau and MAN/Sulzer, it has been argued for a restrictive 
interpretation of international competitiveness as a macroeconomic ground for 
ministerial authorisation so that the concentration has to be necessary for the merging 
parties to participate permanently in the non-German market,116 the Minister in 
E.ON/Ruhrgas introduced that the argument of international competitiveness is not
restricted to concentrations necessary for the companies to compete in the market at all
but includes the preservation of existing competitiveness as well as the strengthening of
a market position in foreign markets.117 At the same time, he also set the ground rule
that the strengthening of market positions of German companies on international
markets is generally not allowed at the expense of the emergence or intensification of a
market-dominating position within Germany.118Also, the Minister stated that it is to be
taken into consideration that international competitiveness of German companies might
lead to macroeconomic disadvantages and detrimental effects on international
competition which might ultimately negatively affect the export focused German
economy.119 The differentiation made by the Minister in Kali+Salz/PCS indicates that
international competitiveness on either the European or only non-European international
market could be sufficient for an authorisation.
It is questionable why this ground for authorisation has been applied very 
restrictively120 since it is the only public interest factor explicitly mentioned by the 
legislator. If the legislator incorporated § 42 I 2 ARC to clarify that it is possible to 
include considerations concerning markets outside Germany the interpretation in the 
cases121 is valid. It is not so if it was introduced to remind the Minister of the 
importance of international competitiveness (‘national champions’) for the common 
welfare.  Indisputably, § 42 I 2 ARC at least obliges the Minister to take international 
competitiveness into his considerations.122 In my opinion, there is no indication in the 
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law itself or in the legislative materials which supports the very restrictive approach in 
the older cases and in that way thwarts the deliberate inclusion of that ground in the 
wording of the law. Hence, the shift of ministerial practice in the E.ON/Ruhrgas case to 
a broader interpretation and less strict approach was necessary.123 This does not mean 
that § 42 I 2 ARC anticipates the result in any way but that the argument is further-
reaching than securing the mere survival on foreign markets and has to be evaluated 
where the positive effects on the performance of the companies on the international 
market are to be expected.   
4. Regional development
This common welfare ground plays only a minor role in ministerial authorisation 
claims. It is correlated with job retention and numerous other public welfare grounds. 
In Kali+Salz/PCS the parties brought forward that an advantage stemming from the 
concentration is the promotion of the development of East Germany. The Minister did 
not examine it in detail but stated that this is only a partial aspect of the common 
welfare grounds of job retention and international competitiveness which he looked at 
in the case.124   
5. Evaluation of the case practice
Looking at the before mentioned grounds for ministerial authorisation, it becomes clear 
that there are rarely single factors standing alone but rather bundles with predominant 
common welfare considerations which make a case available for approval. It can also be 
concluded that common welfare grounds need to be of high significance and require a 
high continuity.125  
Altogether, the Minister is fairly reluctant to make use of the § 42 ARC exception. 
While the reasons are acknowledged in general, the claims predominantly already fail at 
the stage of sufficient proof of probability or the causal link between the concentration 
and the positive effects. The high burdens imposed on the parties to proof their case are 
necessary to secure a high level of market structure protection.  
Nevertheless, the Minister is not allowed to think in the same categories as the general 
public looking at the ministerial authorisation as a way for the companies to ‘get around 
the law’.126 The basic purpose of § 42 I ARC remains to generate public welfare gains 
which otherwise would have been precluded by the purely competitive assessment of 
the BKartA followed by a prohibition in terms of § 36 ARC. Authorising a merger is 
therefore not a favour of the Minister done for the sake of the applying party but a 
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mechanism provided by the legislator not to neglect the opportunity of enjoying 
common welfare gains resulting from a concentration with less competitive 
disadvantages. In conclusion, the Minister should - in cases where this excess of weight 
exists - not be shy to apply § 42 ARC.  
IV. Conclusion
The two-step system works as follows: In the first step, when the BKartA applies § 36 I 
ARC, it makes a decision between the interest of the parties to merge under 
consideration of eventual competition advantages  on the one hand and the protection of 
the market from restraints of competition on the other hand which might trickle down to 
consumer welfare. In the second step, the application of § 42 I ARC by the BMWi leads 
to the decision between the triad of interests described above. 
The prevailing purpose of the second step is to oppose the findings of step one to the 
public interest considerations of advantages to the economy as a whole and overriding 
public interests. In addition, a protection of the markets would also serve the interest of 
third party competitors to act within a functioning market so that this interest is 
additionally weighing on the side for refusal of a ministerial authorisation. 
The system - together with the case practice - has led to the fact that an application for 
ministerial authorisation together with the public interest argument for approval of the 
merger is seldom invoked. Although parties never used the option of § 42 ARC 
regularly, the number of applications even declined with the recent 
EDEKA/Tengelmann case being the only one within the last 7 years. With this, there is 
almost no attention drawn to the public interest consideration in today’s day-to-day 
merger practice in Germany.  
Because of the great importance of the few cases it is nevertheless pivotal to have a fair 
and functioning system. Following the case practice, there are three requirements with 
regard to the common welfare grounds which have to be met in order to qualify for a 
ministerial authorisation. The advantages need to be of sufficient weight, concrete 
provable and have a causal link to the intended merger.127 In the cases, the Minister first 
looks at the latter two requirements avoiding a complex balancing when it is not 
decisive for the case at hand. Therefore, little conclusion on the actual balancing of the 
contradicting factors in detail can be drawn from the case law.  
In order to be able to deal with the cases that need to be decided at the point of 
balancing by weighing the different interests against each, thoughts have to be given to 
the question at which point the advantages are to be determined ‘sufficient’ for a 
ministerial approval. The partly circumvention of this problem by the Minister makes it 
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- if anything - even more necessary and worthy to examine. Exemplary, it is useful to
look at the most frequently used common welfare ground of job retention.
A first obvious attempt to compare secured jobs to the negative competitive effects is 
trying to break both consequences down to an economic number or value (‘tertium 
comparationis’) which makes it possible to easily decide which factor outweighs the 
other. As already stated above, there are existing economic models to describe the 
economic influence of mergers on the market. It is nevertheless dependant on various 
other factors like the economic strategy of the merged company if and to which extent 
net welfare losses as the ultimate risk and reason for prohibiting a merger are possible. 
These losses to society as a whole are more likely to occur where companies have 
market power. Where companies merge, their losses because of consumers changing to 
competitors in reaction to price increases (or lessening of production) are partly avoided 
by integrating one of the competitors in the undertaking. That these evaluations, as well 
as the benefits on the other side of the scale, are based on assessments of the future 
development and probabilities makes it even more difficult. 
An assessment of the economic value of jobs is even more complicated to determine. In 
the light of Art 109 II GG, § 1 StabG respectively, the main reason for the high 
employment and job retention goal is an economic advantage. It is clear that one has to 
focus on the economic gain for the society and not the individual itself. By retaining a 
certain number of jobs, the German welfare state is not burdened with additional social 
benefits. Additionally, taxes and social contributions of the employed are a gain for the 
national budget. Also, it should be acknowledged that purchasing power of the people 
within the state and investments are a key driver of the economy. And although not 
mentioned expressly in the cases decided by the Minister, there are also non-economic 
factors which come into play when looking at job retention. From my point of view, it 
not only allowed but necessary to take these side factors into consideration. Through § 
42 I ARC, the Minister is not limited to evaluate only economic effects. The Federal 
Republic of Germany is a welfare state, cf Art 20 and 28 GG. The resulting welfare 
state imperative requires taking social effects into account. Nevertheless, the social 
value of secured jobs for individuals and their families resulting from a concentration 
cannot be decisive as long as it is not of a significant dimension (see ‘overriding’). But 
people nowadays are alert and concerned about mass dismissals and job losses what 
makes it a question of public moral.128 This is reflected in Minister Gabriel’s speech on 
the reasons for his decision in the EDEKA/Tengelmann case where he mentions that he 
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especially cares about the people who work as part-time employees with low income.129 
Therefore, social aspects also need to form part of the non-economic considerations of 
the Minister.  
There is surely no definite number of jobs which can be weighed up against a certain 
degree of competition restraints. The many different factors intertwined in each case 
make it impossible to establish a general rule. All that can be done and determined is to 
apply the general rules on balancing described above (see B, II, 3, b, aa) and give 
sufficient weight to public interest grounds where they are linked with the merger and 
an occurrence in the future is of high probability. From the case law it can be said that 
the exemption provision of § 42 I ARC applies and overcomes the § 36 ARC 
prohibition only in extreme cases. It has been decided in favour of the applying party 
where either the competition restraint was of little effect (ie Babcock/Artos) or the 
public interest factor was of significant weight (ie E.ON/Ruhrgas). This general caution 
to allow mergers for the reasons laid down in § 42 I ARC is in compliance with the 
primacy of the protection of competition and should generally be upheld. But is 
desirable, that the Minister goes into the analysis and evaluation of the different factors 
in necessary detail where parties have proven probable positive common welfare effects 
of the merger instead of making general assumptions. 
The mechanism of continued long-term monitoring which is prohibited in German 
competition law could help to partly erase uncertainties about positive effects in the 
future, particularly with regard to job preservation (see for more detail D, III).  
Altogether, Germany has a functioning merger review system which puts only little 
weight on public interest influences. This is reflected in the systematic of the law 
allowing public interest considerations only on application pursuant to § 42 ARC where 
the BKartA already prohibited the merger on competitive grounds in the first place. 
Prohibiting a merger because of negative public interest effects, although it does not 
trigger competitive concerns is not possible. The reluctance towards the vague terms is 
reflected in the case law. Sorting out weak cases on grounds of insufficient provability 
or lack of a causal link seems to be a valid method avoiding a complex as well as 
uncertain assessment and balancing of advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless, the 
Minister is obligated to analyse with necessary depth which set of interests outweighs 
the other. Common experiences and general assumptions do not make this analysis 
dispensable. A way of balancing the factors, although not practicable in every case, is to 




C. Public interest influences in South Africa
Public interest influences play a pivotal role in South African merger cases. The public 
interest test which is incorporated in the competition analysis makes the South African 
competition law regime worldwide unique with regard to its merger review system.  
I. Main elements of competition law in South Africa
The South African Competition Act130 governing the competition law in South Africa 
came fully into force on 1 September 1999. It includes provisions dealing with 
restrictive practices, abuse of a dominant position and merger control. 
When looking at competition law in South Africa one always has to bear in mind at 
what stage of development the legislation was passed131 and under which conditions the 
competition authority began to enforce the competition rules. The rules reflect the key 
concerns in South Africa’s society (see in particular section 2 of the Act).132 S 1(2) in 
conjunction with s 2 of the Act already makes clear right at the beginning that 
‘economic, social justice, developmental and transformative objectives’ need to be 
taken into consideration when looking at specific cases.133 
The goals of competition law in South Africa are laid down particularly in the preamble 
and section 2 of the Competition Act. It recognises the injustices which resulted from 
the discriminatory past in this country and accordingly formulates competition policy 
goals for the future. For the purpose of this paper, it is particularly worth noticing that 
the preamble speaks of a balancing between ‘the interests of workers, owners, and 
consumers’.  
This part is particularly concerned with merger control which is regulated in Chapter 3 
of the Competition Act and administered by the Mergers and Acquisitions division of 
the Competition Commission.  
Merger control still plays a very important role in South Africa, which is also due to the 
still comparatively low notification thresholds.134 Therefore, a high number of 
notifications take place each year resulting in a large number of decided merger 
cases.135  
Nevertheless, only few cases give rise to competition concerns with a small number of 
prohibitions standing at the end of merger review processes. This is in line with the 
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general attempt of South African merger control to only prevent anti-competitive 
market structures through mergers.136   
II. South African merger control in detail
S 12 of the Act provides for a definition of a merger. The thresholds determining at 
which point a merger needs to be notified with the Competition Commission, as an 
intermediate or large merger, has to be specified by the Minister (see s 11 of the Act) 
and at the moment lies at R 560m (combined turnover/ asset value), respectively R 80m 
(target turnover/ asset value)137. 
S 12A then describes the considerations to make before the competent competition 
authority comes to its final ruling on approving or prohibiting the proposed merger. The 
analytical framework for the competitive assessment is divided into a two-step 
procedure. Firstly, it has to be looked at the competitive effects of the merger. In detail, 
this means that the authority starts off by determining ‘whether or not the merger is 
likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition’138 on the basis of the factors set out 
in s 12A (2). In a second step, other factors are to be applied. In case of a substantial 
prevention or lessening of competition the competition authority applies the factors 
described in s 12A (1)(a) or if there is no competition effect of concern the ones 
mentioned in s 12A (1)(b). S 12A (1)(a) is subdivided differing between pro-
competitive gains, especially technological and efficiency advantages in (i) and public 
interest grounds in (ii).139  
Noticeably, in contrast to Germany, the rationalisation benefits are not part of the public 
interest test. Following the structure described, they are evaluated in cases of the ‘first 
line of inquiry’ (when substantial negative competition effects are assumed) before the 
public interest concerns come into play.140 The efficiency argument, shorthanded for 
‘technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain’, can turn the initially negative 
competition analysis into a net gain result.  Especially the ‘failing firm defence’ can 
outweigh anti-competitive effects. The enhancement of productive or dynamic 
efficiency may even lead to allowing the merger although there is no definite proof of 
consumer benefits.141 But the standards for a successful efficiency defence are set 
high.142 
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After the efficiency defence has been raised to offset the negative competition effects, it 
is still necessary to apply the public interest test pursuant to s 12A (3).143 But in 
connection with the public interest test, efficiency can become relevant again in terms of 
a justification ground. 
S 12A (1) (a) (ii) and s 12A (b) both refer to s 12A (3)(a)-(d) where the individual 
positive public interest grounds are then listed. Following, these grounds apply to both 
scenarios (‘lines of enquiry’)144, which means that they can either be used to justify the 
authorisation of an anti-competitive merger or cause the prohibition of a merger after a 
positive competition finding. In the latter case, the merging parties will have the 
opportunity to justify the negative public interest effects in order to achieve approval in 
the end.  
After the assessment of all relevant factors, including the assessment of the public 
interest provisions, a decision will be rendered approving (eventually subject to 
conditions) or prohibiting the merger.  
Thereby, historical influences, especially in form of the economic history, play a crucial 
role in the construction145 as well as the implementation146 of the merger control in 
South Africa. 
For competition law as a whole, the Preamble formulates the goal to ‘achieve a more 
effective and efficient economy in South Africa’ (see also purpose of the act in s2(a)). 
III. Public interest test
As described above, the South African competition law provides for a public interest 
test in s 12A (3) of the Act. Including this kind of test in the competition assessment is a 
unique feature of competition law in South Africa. 
1. Context of the public interest test
First of all, it has to be clarified how broadly the public interest factors have to be 
interpreted and implemented when looking at the effects of a merger. 
Extending the mere structural approach, merger control is intended to ultimately also 
protect consumers and consumer welfare which means the reduction in price or an 
increase in output.147 Therefore, the point of departure when deciding upon the approval 
of a merger should be the attempt to enhance rivalry between competitors.148  
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But the assessment does not end at this point. The Act explicitly names public interest 
effects in s 12A (3) which cannot be simply ignored (see evaluation in the Wal-Mart 
case C, IV, 1, e).149 Complications result from the uncertain relation between s 12A (3) 
and other parts of the Act. 
Several aspects of the public interest grounds in s 12A (3) can be found in the preamble 
and the purposes of the Act listed in section 2. It is therefore questionable to which 
extent this can have influence on the application of the public interest test in merger 
cases. The preamble of the Competition Act formulates the goal of ‘regulat[ing] the 
transfer of ownership in keeping with the public interest’. From my point of view, this 
shows that the public interest considerations should play a vital role in South African 
competition law and are intended to be taken seriously as more than just a subordinated 
theoretical concept in the context of competition concerns.  
Also, the role of the purposes in section 2 and their influences on the public interest test 
are disputed. On the one hand, it can be argued in favour of an effect of section 2 on the 
public interest test in the form that it gives public interest grounds further impetus.150 
This view is supported by the fact that section 2 of the Act itself states that its purpose is 
to promote ‘competition in order to achieve’ the goals listed.151 
On the other hand, the specific provisions of s 12A (3) are intentionally phrased 
narrowly for a limited purpose.152 Including the wide range of goals incorporated in 
section 2 would lead to a high complexity. The form of the public interest test chosen in 
the Act being unique, it is additionally more difficult to orientate at foreign competition 
authorities and their case practice.153  
Nevertheless, these arguments cannot lead to the conclusion to not include 
particularities in South Africa and its economic development into the assessment. 
In general, it can be concluded that the competition authorities need to take into account 
serious distributional considerations.154 The public interest grounds cannot be 
interpreted in an ‘infinitely elastic’ way but must fit into the definitions of the Act.155 At 
least, section 2 can be helpful when determining the role of the public interest criteria in 
the merger analysis.156 
149
 Cf Wal-Mart Stores Inc. / Massmart Holdings Limited, 110/CAC/Jul11 and 111/CAC/Jun11 discussed 
below. 
150
 Sutherland, 1-56. 
151
 Sutherland, 1-56. 
152
 Ibid, 1-56. 
153
 Ibid, 1-58. 
154
 2009 Acta Juridica 185, 193 2009. 
155
 Frey, page 48. 
156
 Sutherland, 1-56. 
30 
2. Single consideration aspects
As established above, section 12A (3) requires the competition authorities to take 
interests into consideration that go beyond the mere protection of competition: Reason 
for the introduction of these public interest grounds is the ‘dramatic political events’ 
during the apartheid that made it necessary to include them. 157 
The Act describes in s 12A (3) the four enumerated158 public interest grounds. These are 
namely the effect on a particular industrial sector or region; employment; the ability of 
small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged people to 
become competitive; and the ability of national industries to compete in international 
markets. Just like the different factors developed through German case law, there is no 
clear differentiation and possible overlaps of the concepts159.  
After having determined the public interest factors and the scope of possible 
interpretations, I will now go on analysing the practical application by the competition 
authorities using the most important cases of interest as examples.  
IV. Case studies
For the purpose of this paper, I will concentrate on factors which also play a role in 
German merger control and therefore have the potential of being comparable with 
regard to the case practice. In particular, effects on employment will be the in centre of 
examination. Additionally, I will take a look at the public interest ground described in s 
12A (3)(c) which is of particular interest in South Africa and stands exemplary for 
public policy and the historical influences on competition law in South Africa.  
1. Effect on employment s 12A (3)(b)
The public interest concern described in s 12A (3)(b) gives the competition authorities 
the power to protect levels of employment.160 The high employment goal is already 
manifested in s 2(c) of the Act describing the promotion of employment and the 
advance of the social and economic welfare as a purpose of the act.   
Due to the fact that the South African system also allows for mergers to be prohibited 
on public interest grounds although the concentration is of no competition concerns, the 
focus in most of the problematic cases lies on the negative effect of retrenchments as a 
possible consequence of the merger. Positive effects on the employment market, such as 
the saving or even creation of jobs through the merger, normally only come into 
question in a second step where the merging parties try to prove a net gain justifying the 
157
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negative effects. They are especially considered where the merging parties bring 
forward a failing firm defence.161 
There are several cases particularly dealing with the effect on employment although the 
specific public interest effect is not always expressly mentioned in the decision or might 
be mixed with other public interest concerns. The following cases have employment 
issues at the heart of the debate.  
a. Telkom SA Ltd / TPI Investments / Praysa Trade 1062 (Pty), 81/LM/Aug00
In the Telkom case, one of the Tribunals earlier merger cases, it has been evaluated 
whether the merger will ‘result in the creation or loss of employment’. The Tribunal 
stated that the result then needs to be weighed against other factors that have to be 
considered in terms of the Act.162  
Remarkably, Telkom had already made promises that are congruent with the conditions 
imposed by the Tribunal. In particular, promises not to retrench employees of the 
transferred staff or its own employees for 20 months. This means that conditions have 
been rendered to simply make the promises legally enforceable. 
b. Unilever Plc / Competition Commission, 55/LM/Sep01
In line with the Tribunal’s findings in other cases, it has been made clear that the 
decisions have to ‘balance impacts on competition with employment impacts’ in 
contrast to other regulatory areas (eg: Labour Relations Act) where such a balancing act 
is not to be included.163 The main finding in this case was that negative employment 
concerns shall first be examined in consultations between the parties and tested for 
alternative solutions. Therefore, the Tribunal urged the merging parties to submit 
sufficient information and required them to enter into discussion with the unions to 
negotiate a mutually satisfactory solution.164 
The connection between the ‘initial’ competition test and the public interest concerns is 
shown by the statement of the Commission that the number of potential job losses will 
not lead to a prohibition ‘as long as there are remedies for the anti-competitive 
implications of the proposed transaction’.165 
c. Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited / Goldfields Limited, 93/LM/Nov 04
In regard to legal issues, the case is primarily concerned with the basic conception of the 
public interest test. The Tribunal stated that ‘otherwise’ in s 12A (1)(b) means that the 
public interest test must be applied regardless of the findings on the competition 
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analysis in s 12A (2).166  It was also held that the wording ‘can or cannot’ does not 
imply in any case that a merger approval is dependent on a positive public interest test 
but only requires no substantial negative effect on public interest. 
The negative effects brought forward were a ‘systemic risk’167 (this argument was 
rejected right away) and adverse effects on employment.  
Retrenchments have been expected only for high skilled workers. Hence, the Tribunal 
prohibited retrenchments in the lower level, exclusively allowing job cuts in the 
categories of employees best equipped to secure alternative employment.168 In view of 
the Tribunal, this was sufficient to obviate any substantial public interest concern.  
d. Metropolitan Holdings / Momentum Group Limited, 41/LM/Jul10
Following the Tribunal, the merger between the two firms also does not substantially 
prevent or lessen competition.169 Again, the public interest issue of negative 
employment effects caused by an evaluated ‘net amount’ of 1000 retrenchments is the 
only concern.  
In this decision it has been made clear that in case of substantiality and merger 
specificity of negative employment effects (‘prima facie ground’), the onus shifts to the 
merging parties to justify the retrenchments.170 The Tribunal affirmed the onus in this 
case because the merger fulfilled the requirements of the ‘considerable magnitude and 
[a limited] short term prospect of re-employment’.171 Therefore, the merging parties 
tried to justify the retrenchments against the objections of the NEHAWU.  
In general, to justify the retrenchments parties have to prove that a ‘rational process has 
been followed to arrive at the determination of the number of jobs to be lost’ and the 
negative effect ‘is balanced by an equally weighty, but countervailing public interest, 
justifying the job loss and which is cognisable under the Act’.172 The last part especially 
excludes purely private gains from being valid grounds for justification because the Act 
requires countervailing public interests.173  
The sources of public interests with which it is possible to justify negative public 
interest effects need not be limited to those specifically mentioned in section 12A (3).174 
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166
 93/LM/Nov 04, para 37. 
167
 Ibid, para 69; in favour of the argument it was referred to the “size of these firms and the importance 
of the gold mining industry in the economy”. 
168
 Ibid, para 83. 
169
 41/LM/Jul10, para 60. 
170
 Ibid, para 68-69. 
171
 Ibid, para 69. 
172
 Ibid, para 70. 
173
 Ibid, para 71-74, referring to the structure of s 12A and the preamble of the Act. 
174
 41/LM/Jul10, para 75. 
33 
12A (3).175 These are the failing firm defence; the merger as necessity to be efficient 
and competitive and consumer welfare through lower prices. This list is not enumerative 
so that it is inevitably followed by the question: what are other possible benefits, do 
they have to be similar to the grounds listed in the act and how broad are the terms 
under which other factors can be introduced as an argument.  
The parties in the case referred to enhanced growth opportunities, cost synergies and 
economies of scale which can in parts be seen as public interest grounds outside the 
scope of s 12A (3).  
Looking at the specific circumstances of the case, the Tribunal approved the merger 
subject to the condition of no merger specific retrenchments for two years with some 
exceptions for skilled workers. 
e. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. / Massmart Holdings Limited, 110/CAC/Jul11 and
111/CAC/Jun11
This case, which ultimately has been decided by the Competition Appeal Court in 2011 
is by far the most controversial and popular case in the recent history.  
I will start by trying to look at the case from a purely legal perspective, leaving out the 
highly debated political influences which I will discuss at a later point (see D, II).  
After the Tribunal approved the merger (in line with the recommendation of the 
Commission) describing the merger as of no competition concerns and declaring pre-
merger retrenchments as not merger specific and a R100 million investment programme 
as sufficient to compensate negative public interest effects, the Ministers called for a 
review and SACCAWU appealed the decision. 
The fact that the merger does not raise competition concerns has been uncontested. 
Therefore, the central arguments evolved around the question whether the merger 
causes negative public interest effects which make it necessary to prohibit the merger or 
at least order further remedies.  
The review on the procedural aspects has been dismissed by the Appeal Court.176 The 
appeal brought up the basic question of whether it has to be looked at more than only 
the consumer welfare as ultimate objective of merger review (‘consumer welfare 
approach’)177. The Court stated that of course, weight has to be given to public interest 
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factors as it is expressly demanded by s 12A (3) of the Competition Act,178 and by that 
cautiously embraced a broader view of welfare.179 In conclusion, the problematic and 
central question is one of proportionality. In the case at hand, a balance must be found 
basically weighing positive effects for consumer welfare against possible negative 
effects to the detriment of employment and small and medium sized businesses.180 The 
appeal court tried to solve this lockdown by not deciding between the one or the other 
but by securing the gains of lower post-merger prices by approving the merger and 
mitigating the losses of fewer jobs in South Africa by ordering the creation of an 
investment fund.181  
Despite the factual arguments in this case, there are two general rules that can be taken 
from this decision: Firstly, all public interest effects need to be ‘substantial’ which 
means that they have to be of considerable weight and secondly, the wording 
‘substantial’ indicates a presumption in favour of merger approval.182    
Finally, the Court decided on the basis of the particular circumstances of the case that 
the merger should be approved on the conditions that the over 500 retrenched workers 
must be reinstated, no further retrenchments will take place for two years, the position 
of SACCAWU remains guaranteed for at least three years and an investment condition 
for the benefit of small and medium sized South African suppliers which has been made 
subject to further specification.  
Apart from the legal questions, politics played a major role in the history of the Wal-
Mart case. To a great extent, the review and appeal against the Tribunal decision were 
economically and labour-politically motivated.  
The Ministers as parties (see s 18 (1) Competition Act) only have the right to review a 
decision on procedural grounds. But it seemed that the Ministers tried to use the 
instrument of review to turn down an unwelcoming decision of the Tribunal for material 
reasons. This is already shown in the doubts expressed by the Appeal Court regarding 
the review character of the Minister’s complaint.183 Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the appeal that has been disguised as a review has been dismissed by the Court. 
From a substantive point of view, the Ministers and the SACCAWU were mostly 
concerned about Wal-Mart’s labour policies, particularly non-unionisation strategies, 
and wanted to protect local suppliers from competing with international rivals184. 
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Remedies directly aimed at the former concern have been declined.185 The Appeal Court 
was right to state that these matters lie outside the scope of competition law and must be 
dealt with through labour law and collective power. In my opinion, the remedy ordered 
regarding the competitiveness of South African small and medium sized businesses is 
preferable to the remedies proposed by SACCAWU.  Apart from legal and 
practicability problems following from a domestic content requirement and import 
restrictions, it would be the wrong signal for the local businesses to use tools of 
protectionism in times of globalising economic markets. That protectionism is not the 
objective of the Act can already be read from s 12A (3) where it says ‘ability [...] to 
become competitive’ and not exclusion of foreign competition. 
The remedies are trying not to intervene in fields that are reserved to other (control) 
mechanisms but are aiming to pave the way for an efficient solution for the South 
African economy and its players which could be called ‘help for self-help’.  
In the end, the decision can be seen as an example for a sensible compromise which can 
only be realised through the use of moderate remedies. Whereas less complex and less 
labour intensive ‘all-or-nothing decisions’ (approval or prohibition of the merger) will 
inevitably lead to a win-lose situation in one or the other way, the range of possible 
remedies open up the opportunity to come to a satisfying result for both sides. 
The history of the case shows how closely related particularly that area of competition 
law can be to politics and current policies. It remains questionable how to evaluate the 
drastic attempt of political interference with the independent competition authorities 
(see D, III).    
f. BB Investment Company (Pty) Ltd / Adcock Ingram Holdings (Pty) Ltd, Case 
No 018713 
What can be taken from this decision is the interpretation of the ‘merger specificity’ 
requirement that is read from s 12A (3) ‘merger will have an effect on’ and interpreted 
as a ‘nexus associated with the incentives of the new controller’.186  
Furthermore, - building upon the findings of the Unilever decision - it is the duty of the 
parties who are planning to retrench jobs to provide sufficient information to the 
employees or the Commission so that a process of consultation can be duly exercised. 
This seems to be reasonable to be able to check for alternative solutions with the intent 
to secure at least some of the jobs in question.187 
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The merger has been approved with the condition that there will not be any further 
retrenchments for one year. Problematic was only whether all retrenchments should be 
prohibited or only merger specific retrenchments. The Tribunal decided to render a 
remedy following the former. It is disputable whether Tribunal ordered the right 
remedy. Including merger specific retrenchments in the moratorium prevents from 
complex differentiation problems at a later stage.188 But at the same time, it is at the risk 
to paralyse business strategies of the new entity which should not be underestimated. In 
the end, the relatively short period of one year makes the decision appear reasonable. 
g. Conclusion 
Most of the cases do not raise competition concerns189 and the majority of cases 
involving a public interest evaluation are concerned with employment issues, in 
particular the retrenchment of jobs as negative public interest effect. Not only do they 
form the majority of the cases but also include the most controversial cases of the 
highest public attention. 
The public interest test results in substantial negative effects on the employment where 
the number of people who might lose their jobs is high. Obviously, this figure is not 
uniform for all mergers but depends on the context, especially the total workforce of the 
firms and eventual retrenchment packages.190 Additionally, the sector as well as the skill 
level of the workers, ultimately the chances of short term re-employment have influence 
on the ‘substantiality‘.  While the adverse effect on public interest is always higher 
where unskilled workers are affected who on the average will stay unemployed for a 
longer time, it seems to be of special importance in South Africa. In the aftermath of the 
apartheid policy and the exclusion of the black population from education, South Africa 
has a large number of unskilled workers. To fight the high percentage of unemployed 
people among (disadvantaged) unskilled workers, the existing jobs need to be protected 
willingly to also further promote the goal of equality. 
When negative effects on employment are raised in the ‘second line of inquiry’, the 
focus lies on the balancing between this negative effect and possible public interest 
justifications that speak for the approval of the merger although the public interest 
analysis is not completely isolated from the findings of the initial competition 
evaluation.  
In the first place, the parties then normally try to relativize the negative effect on 
employment and provide arguments for the positive effects that their economic business 
strategy might have on the job development. They often present that the number of job 
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retrenchments is (partly) offset by the job opportunities through business growth, 
redeployment etc.191 To put it in a nutshell, the real question turned on a ‘jobs lost – 
jobs saved’ argument.192 
Besides this, there are other public interest factors that can be raised in favour of an 
approval. Without doubt, the parties can present evidence for the grounds listed in s 
12A (3). It is questionable which other grounds can be brought forward. The exemplary, 
not exhaustive193 list from the Metropolitan case already gives an indication of further 
possible grounds outside the scope of the Act. The ground has to be of public interest. 
Conceivable grounds are those comparable to the failing firm defence, the efficiency 
and competitiveness argument or consumer welfare. The limits of interpretation of 
public interest grounds should not be too narrow. The relevance of the argument can 
subsequently still be weighed accordingly in the evaluation process.  
Generally, the merging parties are, if at all, only partly successful in justifying the 
retrenchments so that the competent competition authority imposes remedies that secure 
the jobs that are not retrenched on justified grounds. With the focus on employment 
issues, it is logical to approve the merger in these situations with a condition that 
obviates the negative effects. Merging parties frequently make proposals for the nature 
of the condition themselves. Possible remedies are for example the restriction of job 
losses, a moratorium, providing money for funds and re-employment obligations.  In the 
end, the issue of job losses can and often is being addressed by prohibiting job cuts (for 
a period of time) leading to a conditional approval.194  
It is common practice and generally appropriate to restrict the conditions to merger 
specific retrenchments because there are no substantive reasons to prohibit other 
retrenchments in the course of a merger review. In prohibiting any job cuts, the 
competition authority would infringe the entrepreneurial freedom to choose one’s own 
business strategy – the reference to otherwise complex differentiations is not 
convincing, nor is the emergency solution of a strict time limitation used in the BB 
Investment case. The authorities have to face challenging tasks and need to expand their 
qualified staff and enhance their expertise. Simplicity of solutions at the expense of 
potential gains for the national economy should not be promoted.  
These remedies, in particular moratoriums, come with the problematic side effect that 
they have to be monitored (by the competition authority) which is connected with cost 
and time consuming administrative expenses, possibly over a period of several years.  
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Looking at it from a general perspective, through the justification mechanism shifting 
the onus to the merging parties – although there are no competition concerns –, the state 
regularly intervenes in business strategies where job retrenchments are included. 
Certainly, this intense focus on the preservation of jobs has its background in the high 
unemployment rates and relatively weak economy in South Africa. The large 
expenditure is therefore necessary and adequate. Nevertheless, the competition 
authorities are well advised to carefully pay attention to the overall economic impacts of 
the decisions and not lose sight of the bigger picture.  
2. Effect on the ability of national industries to compete in international
markets s 12A (3)(d)
Also the foundation for the consideration of this effect is already laid down in the 
Preamble: ‘create greater capability and an environment for South Africans to compete 
effectively in international markets’ (see also purpose of the act in s 2(d)). 
Parties relatively seldom invoke this public interest ground. Cases in which it has been 
argued for are Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited / Stellenbosch Farmers Winery 
Group Ltd. and Tiger Brands Ltd - Ashton Canning Company (Pty) Ltd - Newco - 
Langeberg Foods International Ashton Canning Company (Pty) Ltd195. 
In the Distillers Corporation case, the public interest grounds in question were 
international competitiveness and the effect on a particular region on the one side and 
negative employment effects on the other side. 
The Tribunal elaborated that each public interest ground should be viewed in isolation 
and be tested for substantiality.196 Only afterwards, the different grounds should be 
reconciled or balanced which then results in a net conclusion. It emphasised that the 
analysis generally can be done without balancing because ‘opposing interests can travel 
past one another on the road in their separate lanes’197. It was stated that, in contrast to 
the competition evaluation described in s 12A (2), the legislation does not offer a list of 
criteria that should be used when evaluating the public interest effect.198 Therefore, the 
attempt to provide Guidelines199 (see C, IV, 5) for the public interest assessment is a 
step in the right direction. 
In conclusion, there are potentially two stages of balancing. The first within the public 
interest category, weighing different public interest effects. And a second after 
195
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concluding a substantial public interest, whether that effect alters the conclusion on the 
competition grounds.200 
3. Effect on a particular industrial sector or region s 12A(3)(a) 
After the negative competition evaluation in the Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd / Transvaal 
Suiker Bpk case201, the parties raised public interest defences referring to each category 
listed in s 12A (3), including the effect on a particular region202. In particular, the parties 
elaborated on the positive impact on the Mpumalanga region and the Southern African 
region through the procurement of imputs from local suppliers and the sale of land.203 
Although these effects seem to have an undoubted positive effect on the region, they did 
not fulfil the preceding requirements of merger specificity and substantiality, making a 
balancing between competition and public interest tests obsolete.   
In the Anglo American case, a regional public interest effect was brought forward on 
grounds of proposed investments in the Northern Cape region and knock-on effects on 
the local economy. 204 Here, it was the lack of certainty and non-binding nature of 
promises which led to rejection of the argument but was not decisive in the end. 
The Tribunal found that the parties in Iscor Ltd / Saldanha Steel (pty) Ltd successfully 
invoked the failing firm defence resulting in a positive competition finding.205 
Interestingly, the Tribunal additionally examined the positive effect the merger possibly 
has on the particular industrial sector or region. It stated that the economic life of the 
West coast region with its firms and individuals are closely connected to the functioning 
of the plants.206 Also, the fact that the firm is a good corporate citizen and involved in a 
number of important social programs weighed for a positive public interest conclusion. 
4. Effect on the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by 
historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive s12A(3)(c) 
A particularity of South African competition law lies within this historically motivated 
public interest factor. It is a legislative reaction to the apartheid economic system which 
led to a high concentration in the economy.207 Like most of the other public interest 
considerations, it is also reflected in (the preamble and) s2 of the act, in particular s 2 (f) 
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focussing on the ‘increase [of] ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons’. 
It has to be seen in the light of the BEE and BBBEE policies208.  
The difficulty with this public interest concerns can be seen in Shell South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd and Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd which was found to be pro-competitive. In a second 
step, a possible prohibition (or approval with condition) was then taken into 
consideration looking at a possible negative impact on the public interest factor 
described in s 12A (3)(c).  
In this decision, the public interest evaluation is described as a balancing act between 
public interest and competition.209 Although the public interest test is generally 
independent from the competition assessment, there is an undeniable correlation when 
deciding upon a merger case. 
In s 12A (1)(b) the Act gives a reference how to solve cases of the concurring interests 
by requiring a ‘substantial’ public interest ground.210 But this is only a first step in the 
public interest test and indication of relationship to the competition effect. As I already 
stated above, a sometimes even more complex balancing question rises after the 
determination of ‘substantiality’ within the public interest considerations where the 
merging parties are given the opportunity of justification. Then, an earlier positive 
competition assessment only plays a minor role in the background of the evaluation of 
the different public interest effects and their relation to each other. In ‘first line of 
inquiry’ cases (cases with negative competition finding), the balancing of competition 
aspects against public interest concerns is more obvious (see case above).  
Conditions were recommended because of the negative impact on the competitive 
position of Tepco that has been controlled by Thebe, a firm controlled by historically 
disadvantaged persons. Such conditions, viewed in the light of BEE, can be critical and 
dangerous for the firms and people that the provision seeks to protect. I support the 
view of the Tribunal, that empowerment does not mean to maintain the control of 
historically disadvantaged people over firms at any price, especially where the 
conditions lead to inappropriate and extreme economic losses for the firm resulting in a 
disadvantage in the end. 
It is not the intention of s 12 (3)(c) to let the competition authorities impose conditions 
or even prohibit commercially prudent decision with the intent of protection where in 
reality, it is fatal for the economic forthcoming. Therefore, the authorities should be 
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careful in trying to support historically disadvantaged people when it includes an 
intervention in a commercial decision.211  
This ‘false paternalism’ can hinder firms to achieve the best result possible212 and in the 
worst case even discriminate against the people it seeks to protect through the limitation 
of possible actions. 
Therefore, the analysis should be exercised with emphasis on the economic realities to 
not impose ill-conceived protection measures out of excessive formalism.   
Furthermore, the decision contained an important finding on the extent of the regulatory 
area of competition authorities in comparison to other authorities. It is said that 
competition authorities are supposed to ‘defend [..] the public interest listed in the Act, 
at most, secondary to other statutory and regulatory instruments’ and not to ‘pursue 
their public interest mandate in an over-zealous manner’. 213 Nevertheless, the Tribunal 
in Metropolitan/Momentum made clear that a deferential approach does not mean a 
hands-off approach.214 
Ultimately, the Tribunal – in contrast to recommendation by the commission - granted 
an approval without conditions.  
5. Draft Guidelines 
The economic development department (in particular the Competition Commission 
itself215) is currently making an attempt to help the competition authorities by 
specifying the terms of the assessment of the public interest test and at the same time 
making decisions based on public interest evaluations more transparent for merging 
parties and competitors as well as consumers. Therefore, it has released draft guidelines 
on the assessment of public interest provisions216. These guidelines are structuring the 
way in which public interest concerns have to be evaluated and are giving examples for 
possibly successful public interest arguments.  
In the guidelines, the commission’s general approach to assess public interest provisions 
is laid down structuring the assessment in a five-step analysis. First, to look at the effect 
on a public interest ground, then see if the effect is linked to the merger (‘causally 
related to, or results or arises from’) and then determine whether the effect is 
substantial. Only after this analysis, the commission will go into balancing the factors 
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against each other. In a last step, the commission will ‘consider possible remedies to 
address the substantial negative public interest effect’.  
In addition, the guidelines are working with non-exhaustive lists of consideration 
factors (cf Guidelines 7.2.1.1., 7.2.3.1., 8.1.3.1., 9.1.1.1. etc.) and the tool of 
presumptive examples (cf Guidelines 8.1.4.4., 9.1.4.3. etc.).  
It nevertheless expressly acknowledges that merger cases (always) need to be decided 
on a case-by-case basis dependent on the facts of the specific case.217  
The improved transparency – if the guidelines are implemented correctly and 
consistently in the future – can ultimately lead to a better predictability of the decisions 
of the competition authorities and more legal certainty. But it has to be kept in mind that 
the guidelines can only – congruent with its restricted objective – ‘indicate the approach 
the [Competition] Commission is likely to follow’218.  
To make the guidelines as beneficial as possible for both sides of a merger case, the 
draft guidelines are currently up for comment.219  
It can only be hoped that the guidelines are as successful as the many examples of 
guidelines introduced by the European Commission with regard to competition law 
assessments (eg Guidelines for the assessment of vertical restraints, Guidelines for the 
assessment of technology transfer agreements220 ) and help both sides to avoid 
misunderstandings and work together for solutions more effectively.  
6. Evaluation of the case practice 
The question is how to evaluate the decision practice of the authorities (especially the 
Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court) described above. 
With now 15 years of experience, the South African competition authorities can look at 
a rich case practice.221 Although having this much of experience, the South African 
merger control bodies can only provide some ‘rules of thumb’ so far.222 These are now 
laid down in the Draft Guidelines summarising the essential doctrines that can be taken 
from the casuistry of the competition authorities.  
In fact, the public interest test only forms a relatively small part in most of the merger 
reviews. This is due to the primarily focus on the initial competition analysis at the 
                                                           
217
 See Guidelines Preface 1.3 and Discretion 11 which also allows for the consideration of other factors. 
218
 Guidelines Objectives 4.1. 
219
 The deadline for submission of comments is the 29
th
 of January 2016. 
220
 Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
to technology transfer agreements. 
221
 See Activity Update, http://www.compcom.co.za/merger-and-acquisition-activity-update/.  
222





beginning of the evaluation.223 Moreover, it makes sense because the majority of the 
proposed mergers do not raise competition concerns. Consequently, the only duty of the 
authority is then to deny (or more comprehensive to determine and balance) a negative 
substantial public interest impact as an effect of the merger.  
In many of the problematic cases, the focus lies more on the weighting of different 
public interest factors against each other,224 which is not less challenging than to 
balance competition and public interest factors. The public interest grounds do not 
always point to the same net conclusion but may lead to opposing conclusion making an 
internal weighing up necessary before turning to the overall balancing task.225 
Especially employment issues are often imposed as a factor of negative public interest 
impacts adverse to competitive unobjectionable merger. 
Where such a balancing of competition and public interest effects is necessary, the 
South African merger control faces similar problems as the German does. Also the 
South African competition authorities have to acknowledge that the value-laden norms 
and standards of the public interest test are generally incommensurable and therefore 
make it difficult if not impossible to find an ‘elusive balance between public interest 
and competition’.226 One attempt to make balancing more accessible would be to aim at 
a singular standard, for example allocative efficiency or total welfare; but the diversity 
of competition law goals, especially in South Africa make it almost impossible to break 
everything down to one standard.227 It is difficult to give political goals an economic 
welfare value in order to balance them against competition effects. Furthermore, this 
attempt could lead to a dilution of the non-economic goals of the South African Act 
such as the promotion of equality. Nevertheless, economic considerations as ‘the point 
of departure should play an important role in performing this balancing act’.228 
Through the structure of the merger analysis starting with the pure competition 
evaluation, the public interest test is conducted through the filter of the findings on the 
first step.229 While the Tribunal frequently declined to exercise an actual face to face 
balancing, it also stated that the two analyses are not ‘separate and distinct’ but the 
public interest finding is to be made ‘in relation to’ the earlier competition study.230   
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In addition, Section 2 with its broad range of goals231 ‘should be carefully considered 
when competition authorities approach evidence, or ponder factual disputes and evenly 
balanced arguments of conflicting parties’.232  
Especially the public interest effect on ‘employment’ is in the centre of attention which 
correlates with the concerns about employment expressed by the Minister of Economic 
Development.233 Where there is such a concern, the competition authorities developed a 
practice of imposing conditions in order to address the public interest concern (for 
possible remedies see 8.1.5.2 of the Draft Guidelines).234 In contrast to the BB 
Investment case, the authorities changed to an approach of only prohibiting merger 
specific retrenchments. This financial year alone, eight large mergers have been 
approved with employment conditions (more than 29 in total).235  The potential of the 
other public interest grounds does not seem to be exhausted and leaves room for 
stronger arguments and more recognition by the competition authorities. 
International competitiveness, the effect on particular industrial sectors or regions and 
the concern described in s 12A (3)(c) (in particular the effect on small businesses) are – 
in the cases where it has been part of the public interest debate – normally used as 
positive public interest effect. These effects, when raised in form of public justification 
grounds are often times submitted together because they are economically interrelated. 
In contrast to this, the effect on firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged 
persons, especially when brought forward as negative impact on public interests, is very 
controversial because conditions based on this concern can easily transform into a 
disadvantage for the firms. Frey claims that ‘South Africans [are] willing to pay a 
supra-competitive cartel price as a cost of bringing historically excluded population into 
the economic mainstream.’236 In the Wal-Mart case, it was also discussed whether the 
benefit of low prices should be shared between the consumers and workers.237 This 
shows that public interests can cause a shift away from the purely economic based 
consumer welfare approach.  
Rationalisation benefits which are not a public interest concern represent a special 
category. It is used as defence against a negative competition evaluation and sometimes 
finds its way into the justification grounds raised in response to a negative public 
interest effect. 
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Although the public interests are expressly categorized into different groups by the law, 
the exact public interest concern and provision that is being looked at in the particular 
case are often times not named. It can be said that most factors are intertwined and 
therefore it is not always practicable to artificially divide the analysis into the single 
concerns. Nevertheless, it is desirable that for the purpose of clarity and transparency 
the competition authorities upfront name the sections of the Act that are being evaluated 
in the case at hand. 
Overall, the most difficult and challenging aspect for the authorities when looking at a 
merger is the balancing, which is intercorrelated with an economic analysis of the 
effects that result from the merger, especially because it includes an assessment of the 
future.238 
There will always be the inevitable problem of predicting the future in a system of 
merger control that intervenes before the implementation of the merger.239 From my 
point of view, it is nevertheless the better alternative to a post-merger control with a 
highly complex divestiture proceeding in the case of prohibition. The decision making 
in merger cases has become more and more complex over time and important mergers 
that were in the centre of public attention have put increased focus on the work of 
competition authorities. The complexity is partly due to the more experienced parties to 
a merger case in South Africa nowadays that are equipped to go into the details of the 
case and try to analyse them in more specific economic terms. 
The competition authorities have taken up this task and - despite political interference 
capable of undermining the independence and authority of the competition authorities as 
seen in the Wal-Mart case240 - successfully maneuvered themselves through the 
obstacles and challenges of a worldwide unique and new approach to address the 
influence of public interest on competition law which resulted in the development of a 
reasonable and coherent case practice. The authorities are well advised to keep 
following that track and give considerable weight to public interest concerns, bearing in 
mind the tremendous importance of a growing economy for South Africa as a whole. 
V. Conclusion
The competition authorities have a particularly important role to play in implementing 
public policies and helping the forthcoming of the nation’s economy in a way that pays 
attention to public concerns at the same time. 
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It is enormously difficult to satisfy the combined goals of competitiveness and 
development241 which require a competition analysis under strict antitrust standards on 
the one and tackling the inequalities of the past on the other side.242 This extremely 
challenging task can only be mastered with a certain amount of experience, expertise 
and enough staff to cope with the increasing number of large and complex merger 
cases243 brought before the competition bodies. Particularly in the present times, the 
stakes for the future of the country are high. 
A step into the right direction is the introduction of the Guidelines which provide some 
instructions for the authorities. Amongst the effects described, the Guidelines can also 
help to promote a clearly structured and therefore very efficient analysis of the cases.  
Still, further reinforcement of the staff in numbers and training is inevitable. In addition, 
the resources available should be spent primarily on the more significant cases. 
Because of the systematic leaving the competitive assessment as well as the public 
interest considerations to the competition authorities, one also has to look at the 
boundaries and competences of other authorities which might be better suited to deal 
with the specific issue in question.244 In contrast to Frey, who criticised the authorities 
to hide behind formalistic arguments, political deference and self-imposed limits245, I 
see it more as a cautious approach in regard to ‘other regulators’.246 I consider positive 
the fact that the competition authorities are not exceeding their competences, claiming 
to have the power over every aspect connected with competition evaluations and issuing 
remedies in fields where they do not have sufficient expertise. Nevertheless, it is 
important that the authorities act consequently and confident where it is necessary. 
Through the power to prohibit a merger or issue far reaching remedies, the competent 
authorities can take measures that do not leave them ‘toothless’.   
The authorities are generally very reluctant to prohibit a merger and almost always try 
to ‘heal’ the merger through the use of conditions.247 This is not a problem in itself 
because parties who notify a merger with the competition commission normally already 
examined the probability of a prohibition and therefore refrain from mergers which raise 
obvious, not surmountable competition or public interest concerns so that they do not 
even reach the level of merger review. A subsequent problem is the high administrative 
effort needed to control and supervise the different conditions imposed, especially those 
which require long-term monitoring. Because of the many remedies that are ordered, the 
high approval rate does not implicate that the authorities are inactive. 
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Especially in developing countries, an active and confident competition authority is 
indispensable because (in general), public interest considerations here are of even 
greater importance.248 This includes South Africa which still suffers from the politic of 
the apartheid regime. Public interest considerations have to be given considerable 
weight because of the important industrial policy goals and the not yet fully reached aim 
that competition authorities achieve unquestionable credibility and legitimacy.249 To 
gain credibility and legitimacy it is necessary to take on popular sentiments and take 
account of major economic problems and aspirations.250 Therefore, the development 
dimension cannot be treated as a second-order matter.251 The inclusion of public interest 
factors may help to promote a more effective competition enforcement in the long 
run.252  
The historic development and the repercussions of the apartheid regime do not only play 
a role in the context of section 12A (3)(c)  and the public interest ground protecting 
small businesses and firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons 
but also in the evaluation of other public interest grounds like section 12A (3)(a)253.254  
The desirable attempt to include this public interest dimension in the framework of a 
merger analysis requires the competition bodies to give the interests a certain weight or 
value that turns the vague policy goal into a concrete and tangible factor. Therefore, the 
core centre of every complex merger case is the economic analysis of the single effects 
which is illustrated by the exchange of arguments in the Wal-Mart case. There are 
different economic models255 that try to capture and explain the impact of a merger. 
Based on this observation, the competition authorities need to have an informed 
understanding of economics and basic economic business models (especially 
rationalisation strategies). Factors that lie beyond their insight, in particular single 
business concepts, should generally not be impaired by the authority’s interference. This 
includes that authorities should not be tempted to misuse their power to second-guess 
commercial decision or influence economic decisions of a firm in a paternalist manner. 
The authorities only fulfil the task to secure an economic environment so that the firms 
are able to compete on the markets using their own business strategies. 
Competition authorities are not only assigned the task to look at the single merger case 
but have to think in macroeconomic policy dimensions. The policy priorities of the 
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Tribunal are aligned with the national priorities, for example the creation of five million 
new jobs by 2020. In my opinion, this is only possible through growth and 
competitiveness on the global market which stands in contrast to standstill that 
exclusively aims at the preservation of the existing jobs at any costs. The authorities 
need to behave in a far-sighted manner taking account of their responsibility for the 
functioning of the markets. 
With this, the underlying goal of competition law remains that the authorities need to 
further the promotion and protection of competition and the public interest. It is 
important to promote national competition through merger control in order to ‘prepare’ 
South African firms for the globalized international market. This approach is reflected 
in the Tongaat case, where the Tribunal took the stance that ‘the most aggressive and 
successful international competitors are those who face robust competition at home’.256 
The extremely difficult task arising from merger review cases requires looking at a 
single merger case, the single product market, the overall economic situation, policy 
goals, the historical influences and consequent inequalities all at the same time. In order 
to do justice to this task, the competition authorities have to find a balanced approach. It 
is for them to act with sensitivity using their economic instinct, hold their ground 
against unlawful political influences without over-interpreting their role by avoiding 
over-regulation and securing the companies’ individual economic sphere. 
D. Comparison of the different approaches  
I. Structural framework of the public interest test 
There are structural differences between the German and the South African approach to 
the inclusion of public interest factors into the merger review system. Germany on the 
one side has implemented a two-step system strictly separating the competition analysis 
from public interest considerations. The second step including public interest factors is 
not automatically triggered by the notification of a merger case but must be invoked by 
the merging parties. This system emphasizes the role of the public interests provision as 
exemption clause that can only qualify to override a contradicting competition analysis 
in exceptional circumstances. In contrast to the South African Act, the German system 
also does not allow the prohibition of a merger solely on a negative public interest 
evaluation. Public interest factors are excluded where the merger does not raise 
competition concerns.  Nevertheless, the concepts are not as different as they might 
seem to be at first view. In the end, both countries follow the same systematic approach 
with the primacy of the competition evaluation as starting point followed by an 
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ancillary, subsequent public interest test, although the latter is conceptually integrated 
into the competition analysis in South Africa.  
Different from the German public interest test in § 42 ARC which is only invoked if 
there is significant impediment of effective competition, the South African competition 
authorities need to consider public interest evaluations regardless of the outcome of the 
competition analysis. This allows for and indicates the legislator’s intention to a broader 
consideration of public interest factors. It opens up more opportunities to give weight to 
public policies that aim at the development of the national economy beyond the 
restricted view on the effects of the merger on the particular product market(s). But at 
the same time, this also means that mergers in South Africa always have to overcome 
two hurdles, the competitive and the public interest assessment. In theory, the automatic 
evaluation of public interest factors in every notified merger case comes with the price 
of increased investigative efforts and a seemingly overwhelming workload for the 
authorities in charge which might delay the proceedings even if the merger is rather 
unproblematic. The evaluation task for the competent authority becomes more complex. 
But it has to be seen that – in line with s 12 A - a deeper inquiry on the public interest 
effects is only initiated where there are indication for significant effects. Otherwise, the 
authority contents itself with the declaration that there are no public interest effects 
contradictory to the competition finding. 
Both systems are results of different overall approaches and therefore give preference to 
different factors – simplicity and a clear distinction on the one, and a broader inclusion 
of public interest on the other side.  
Additionally, a single-step approach is only practical where both levels are evaluated by 
the same authority.  
II. Decision making power 
Germany does not only separate the two evaluation steps but has a ‘two-step-two-body’ 
approach. Public interest criteria are only evaluated by the Minister of the BMWi 
whereas the competence in South Africa completely lies with the competition 
authorities.  
There are several benefits and problems arising from each of the two different concepts.    
In South Africa, the competition and the public interest decision including the balancing 
of the different factors is unified with the competent competition authority without 
ministerial override.257 In contrast to the Minister in Germany, the South African 
Minister has no decision making powers and is left with the possibility to make 
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representations on public interest grounds (to the Commission, the Tribunal and the 
Competition Appeal Court).258  
The BKartA in Germany is freed from any public interest consideration and is able to 
focus exclusively on the competitive assessment. The decision making power is split 
between the two bodies responsible for different evaluation factors. The Minister, bound 
by the finding that there is a substantial effect on competition, looks at possible public 
interest effects that contradict these effects on competition. Besides the two decision 
authorities, the monopolies commission plays a crucial role in making recommendations 
to the Minister where a Ministerial approval is sought.  
In theory, the clear distinction seems to have the favourable feature that each decision 
body can independently decide upon the question before it. But it is undisputed that the 
public interest factors have to be evaluated in the light of and balanced against the 
competition effects. The outcome of the competition assessment is not a definite figure 
that can easily be offset against public interest effects. It is therefore inevitable that the 
Minister is well-informed about the effects on competition in order to adequately weight 
these effects himself. In conclusion, a clear separation in terms of a Minister who is 
purely concerned with the public interest dimension cannot be made. Hence, it could be 
more practical to entitle the body that was in charge of the competition analysis to 
undertake the subsequent analysis in order to avoid duplicated efforts and make use of 
its expertise.  
The core task of the respective authority is not to give too little or too much weight to 
the public interest factors. On the one hand, it can be expected that the authority 
evaluating the impact on competition gives sufficient weight to the competition 
implications of the merger.259 On the other hand, it could lead to a prejudiced 
competition authority neglecting potentially important public interest considerations. 
The case practice in South Africa does not indicate such a predisposition of the 
competition authorities in favour of clinging to the initial competition finding regardless 
of any substantive public interest concerns. Nevertheless, the executive might be more 
suitable to implement industrial policy, in particular in a developing country such as 
South Africa, to pursue the goal of strengthened selected sectors and interest groups.260 
The common counter argument against Ministerial decision power is that an 
inexperienced public official might give too much weight to social interests.261 In the 
legal reality in Germany, the Minister is rarely confronted with claims for merger 
authorisation. The small number of approved mergers, although he is not completely 
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inexperienced and his decisions are in part based on the legal structure that only allows 
him to approve a merger under exceptional circumstances, disproves or at least opposes 
this proposition. For South Africa, the argument against the transfer of decision power 
to the Minister is weakened by the fact that the South African authorities by now are 
fairly experienced in the field of merger control not unnoticed by the Ministers although 
the events in the Wal-Mart case show a different picture.  
In fact, the Wal-Mart case is only one extreme example to illustrate the importance of 
an independent decision body that only takes into account the factors prescribed by the 
law, unaffected by possible political pressure or lobbying. This is crucial to secure legal 
certainty and to promote the credibility of the deciding authority.  
In the exemplary Wal-Mart case, particularly the Minister of Economic Development 
clearly did not respect the boundaries prescribed by law trying to politically interfere in 
the process. The Ministers (for Economic Development, Trade and Industry and 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) exceeded their role that is by law restricted to 
participate as a party before the competition authorities. From the outset of the case, the 
Minister initiated a parallel proceeding in which he included Wal-Mart and the unions. 
This not only undermines the authority and the standing of the competent authorities but 
also impedes the work of the competition authorities. On top of that, the Minister even 
tried to intervene in the process itself when he was not satisfied with the outcome and 
handling of the case by the competent and independent competition authorities. 
Although the competition appeal court ultimately denied the Minister’s motions, the 
attempt to continuously influence the process caused harm to the development of 
merger review in South Africa. Lewis therefore rightfully called this case a ‘fiasco’.262 
Not necessarily in terms of the outcomes of the case but at least regarding the credibility 
and independence of the competition authorities. It also has the potential to unsettle 
foreign firms like Wal-Mart about investments in South Africa and merging with South 
African firms when they see themselves being exposed to the risk of unpredictability 
through the arbitrariness of the Minister. Merger remedies could be viewed as a factual 
penalty tax on merger transactions of (large) foreign companies and disproportionate 
concessions in favour of the South African jurisdiction.263 The probability that the 
BKartA as the German competition authority is exposed to such influences is low 
because possible attempts to promote a merger on (questionable) public interest grounds 
need to shift to the relevant Ministerial level. Thus, the BKartA can concentrate on its 
work, uninfluenced by other forces and come to an independent finding on the 
competition effects. Especially where public interests are at stake and the law allows for 
a wide discretion, the risk of inappropriate political influence and lobbyism is high. 
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Preventing that these factors can have influence on independent decision bodies must be 
the target of successful merger control systems.   
But this does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the German system is more 
favourable in this respect. Although, the Minister as a political entity experienced in this 
field might be better suited to handle political pressure to approve a merger,264 the 
possibility of lobbyism on Ministerial level might even be more dangerous.265 Decision 
power in the hands of the Minister also bears the risk that the government misuses the 
authorisation for industrial policies (dirigisme).266 Also, combinations of personnel 
between the management of large firms and the state are not unusual. 267 In the light of 
the above, a possible disadvantage of the procedure described in § 42 ARC could be 
that it is less transparent and controlled by other forces than the South African court 
procedures. Where the proceedings occur in a competition tribunal instead of a 
Minister’s office, the arguments are framed and presented differently and it increases 
the transparency.268 The court procedure has the evident advantage that it is a judicial 
process that brings a process into the public that otherwise might be solely exercised in 
political bargaining.269 In addition, the South African system allows for the tribunal 
decisions being reviewed by the competition appeal court.  
Nevertheless, the Ministerial process is not a completely uncontrolled process in the 
discretion of a single person. Firstly, the German Minister has to exercise its power 
subject to the law (Art 20 III GG). In practice, the true decision power often lies with 
the monopolies commission (‘Monopolkommission’). It is a panel of experts that gives 
a recommendation based on competition and public interest evaluations to the Minister 
that is also made public. Therefore, although the Minister is not legally bound by the 
recommendation, he is in some way ‘influenced’ by the monopolies commission. It 
fulfils the function as the ‘regulatory conscience’ of the German government.270 The 
political and public pressure makes it extremely difficult to deviate from the monopolies 
commission’s expert opinion. Exception examples are the highly disputed 
E.ON/Ruhrgas case and the pending EDEKA/Tengelmann case.  
The political considerations are made public through the ministerial approval procedure 
including a mandatory public hearing. The rareness and public suspicion towards 
ministerial authorisations cause a media coverage that makes the process subject to 
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public scrutiny. Especially in high priority cases that can have major impacts on the 
customers, the press and media that are often referred to as the fourth estate, have a 
controlling power on the Minister. The monitoring effect of the public transparency of 
the procedure and the subsequent influences on the political decision process are not to 
be underestimated.  
The judicial review of the Ministerial decision is – due to the economic policy 
influences that cannot be subject to judicial review - limited to a mere review for 
arbitrariness.271 In addition, the Minister and his decisions are to a certain extent subject 
to parliamentary control from the opposition which can intensify the public pressure272 
(see the recent parliamentary question by the ‘Grünen’273).  
Put together, although legally empowered to independently decide to grant or refuse a 
Ministerial authorisation, the Minister as a politician elected by the people is in fact 
controlled and monitored by powerful public forces.    
In South Africa, the open sessions before the Competition Tribunal make the decision 
process very transparently and reduce the likelihood of lobbying.274 Additionally, 
decisions are published which has the positive effects of developing a competition 
jurisprudence and educating practitioners in the field of merger control.275  
It is questionable whether this leads to the conclusion that one system is generally 
superior to the other and should therefore be adapted by the other state. To answer this 
question it is not sufficient to only look at the conceptual advantages and disadvantages 
but the specific circumstances (‘legal reality’) in the respective jurisdictions and the 
objectives that are targeted through the use of one or the other systematic approach. The 
Wal-Mart case does not imply that the system itself is unsuitable for South Africa. 
Hypothetically, the same case with the decision power regarding sufficient public 
interest effects lying with the Minister himself probably would have led to even more 
serious problems stemming from outside factors.276 The ‘fiasco’ therefore does not have 
its roots in an error of the merger review system but the failure of single persons to 
adhere to the provisions and misusing their power.  
In conclusion, the identity of the decision maker has to be adapted to the situation of the 
competition authority in the particular state.277 In Germany, the focus is on securing the 
independence of the BKartA and its credibility while controlling the Minister mainly 
                                                           
271
 Ibid, Rn 181. 
272
 Mattes, page 71. 
273
 A German political party; parliamentary question: https://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/P-
R/Parlamentarische-Anfragen/2016/18-7411.pdf. 
274
 Lewis op cit (n229), page 3. 
275
 Frey, page 49. 
276
 Cf Mattes, page 60. 
277





through the public debate and public pressure.278 The protection of competitive markets 
through merger control in Germany is mainly oriented at economic competition 
standards. It is therefore crucial to have an independent body evaluating the competition 
effects that is not subject to or suspected of lobbyism. This is best realized through a 
clear distinction between the authority entrusted with the competition and public interest 
evaluation, preventing the BKartA from political influences. The few cases in which 
public interest considerations come into play can effectively be handled by the Minister 
who is not biased by a previous competition inquiry and more familiar with the political 
policy dimension determining the weight that should be given to the public interest 
factors. The abolition of the two-step approach and a general change in the merger 
control policy putting more emphasis on public interest criteria is not required (see D, 
III). Furthermore, the policy decision behind it needs to be taken by a politically 
legitimised body.279 In South Africa the situation is slightly different because of the 
inequalities of the historic past and the high unemployment rate that necessitate a 
stronger focus on public interest influences. Here, where the competition authorities are 
not as established yet, the need to further improve the credibility and standing of the 
competition authorities as governmental bodies independent of political influence is 
even bigger – this is today more than ever necessary to be proven to the public in the 
aftermath of the Wal-Mart case which called the independence of the competition 
authorities into question.280 Splitting the decision making power would require to pass 
on every merger review case to the Minister to secure a public interest evaluation in 
each case. This is not practical, nor would it be possible for the Minister281 to cope with 
the additional workload. More important, the acceptance of the competition authorities 
amongst the general public can only be reached if the authorities themselves take on the 
popular sentiments through the implementation of the public interest provisions. 
These considerations make a compelling case for maintaining the different systems in 
the respective states as they are tailored to the needs arising from the countries’ stage of 
the economic and competition enforcement development. 
III. Implementation and remedies 
The competent authorities in both jurisdictions are facing similar problems concerning 
the inclusion of the public interest test in the merger review of an individual case.  
At its core, disputed merger cases are ultimately fought by expert economists who try to 
make the effects on both sides of the balance visible and sizable – especially to quantify 
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the effect on jobs in South Africa.282 A great example is the Wal-Mart case, where 
economists on both sides of the table used economic models to determine the conflated 
upside and downside effects resulting from the merger. At the same time, it shows how 
vague these models are, basing the result on indispensable uncertainties and 
estimations.283  
But recent years have shown that economic analysis is developing as the merger control 
as a whole. The requirement to quantify the effects is an incentive to parties to come up 
with sophisticated approaches,284 although a certain degree of inaccuracy will always 
remain. 
Based on these economic evaluations, competition authorities will have to balance the 
generally incommensurable factors against each other. This applies in particular to at 
least partly economically measurable factors such as those described in the first 
alternative of § 42 Abs. 1 ARC and less to socio-economical factors. For this, the 
authorities can make use of different sources of orientation. It has to be kept in mind 
that it is impossible and undesirable285 to regulate every single case by law. In general, 
case practice can be an effective instrument to substantiate questions of balancing and 
give guidelines. In some areas of public interest concerns, decisions of the competition 
authorities – in Germany as well as in South Africa – have brought forth general 
standards that can be applied beyond the single merger case. 
The problem in this matter is that the terms are too broad and the consideration criteria 
as well as the cases vary immensely so that casuistry alone falls short of providing a 
reliable guideline.286 All that can be extracted from the cases are therefore some rules of 
thumb.  
Where casuistry alone is not sufficient, the introduction of regulatory guidelines with 
presumptive examples could provide a helpful source. The introduction of guidelines287 
can be a way out of a complex and inscrutable construct of casuistry. In Germany, the 
comparable instrument of administrative regulations (‘Verwaltungsvorschriften’) is 
available to the authorities to introduce such. The side-effect of increased transparency 
could also help to improve the reputation and strengthen the acceptance of merger 
decisions by the parties and the general public.  
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Nevertheless, there are also differences between the two jurisdictions that lead to 
different degrees of implementation with regard to public interest concerns. Although 
very similar in the basic concept, the statutory specifications already display the 
different starting positions for the evaluation of public interest factors by the national 
authorities. In specific terms, the South African Competition Act includes provisions 
with defined public interests in contrast to the broad, undefined terms in the ARC.  
Although it is certainly true that the inclusion of the specific goals like these described 
in s 12A(3) make assessments much more complex for the competition authorities, this 
argument cannot rule out the fact that these considerations are also necessary to be 
looked at in South Africa at this stage of development. Based on these provisions that 
‘seek to correct socio-economic disadvantage and distortion which arose as a result of 
South Africa’s discriminatory past’288, the public interest considerations seem to be 
taken into consideration less reluctantly and discussed more vividly in comparison to 
other jurisdictions. One reason for this is, as Frey describes it, that public interests in 
South Africa ‘go much deeper and seek to heal much more severe wounds’.289 
Especially, high unemployment and the poor state of the economy have led to 
prominent public interest considerations in the recent past.290 Competition authorities in 
South Africa have the task to care for public considerations on the same level with 
competition concerns.291 To the present day, merger practice falls short of the ambitious 
goals of the Act in terms of economic development and equality. There is a need for 
emancipation of the competition authorities. Without a confident and independent 
merger review body acknowledging and promoting the goals laid down in the Act, it is 
impossible to establish public acceptance and support the future growth of the country. 
Nevertheless, I see it less drastically than Frey who interprets the Tribunal to have been 
given up on fighting the inequalities of the past.292 The instruments to fight against still 
existing inequalities and economic downfall are available. Although it is not the 
competition authorities’ core competence to compensate the failures of general politics, 
South Africa’s society can only emerge where all governmental bodies make joint 
efforts. The Wal-Mart case indicated that the competition authorities are not willing to 
yield to political pressure.  This confidence should help to strongly promote the goals of 
the South African Competition Act in the future. 
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Although the need to include public interest influences lies more with developing 
countries such as South Africa, the process in the EDEKA/Tengelmann merger case 
shows that particularly the public interest factor of job preservation in general is of 
absolutely great importance, even when the economy and the job market are currently 
strong293. 
As I noted above, the German merger regime does not need a radical structural change 
that leads to an automatic inclusion of public interest factors in merger cases. 
Nonetheless, the Minister should enhance the importance of public interest influences 
by giving them greater weight in the individual Ministerial authorisation evaluations. 
Looking exclusively at the success rate294 of applications for Ministerial authorisation, 
the Minister seems to attribute high importance to public interest factors. But bearing in 
mind the small number of applications indicating that the parties in these cases had 
substantive reasons to believe that the application will succeed changes the view on the 
situation (overall only 22 applications in 42 years; one every two years).    
In contrast, South Africa has not prohibited any merger in the recent past.295 This is in 
part a consequence of a different approach to public interest concerns and particularly a 
different use of remedies. The Guidelines explicitly include the remedies in the review 
scheme and list the remedies available for the different factors and thereby encourage 
the use of conditions not only from the perspective of the competent authority but also 
form the parties’ perspective which can come up with possible (conditional) solutions to 
save the intended merger from being prohibited. Under the South African Act, 
competition authorities have the possibility to render continued long-term monitoring 
(used especially with regard to the job preservation argument). The Minister in 
Germany is only authorised to structural measures. This excludes especially conditions 
that oblige not to cut jobs within a certain period of time subsequent to the merger.  
In favour of the German regulation in § 42 II 2 in connection with § 40 III 2 ARC it can 
be held that such remedies are not more efficient than the influences of the works 
council and labour union because they cannot change economic necessities – 
furthermore, they might even impede structural adjustment processes necessary to 
secure jobs in the long term.296  
Nevertheless, in comparison to South African practice, the possibility of approvals 
subject to conditions has been treated shabbily. A counter example is the recent 
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development and the conditions suggested by the Minister Sigmar Gabriel in the 
EDEKA/Tengelmann case (see B, III, 1, g). Here, the Minister tries to obtain the goal of 
secured long-term preservation of jobs through obliging EDEKA to enter into collective 
labour agreements which include a prohibition to lay off more than 5% of the workers. 
The instrument of collective labour agreements is supposed to secure this goal through 
the control of labour unions.297 
The tendency shown by the Minister’s considerations in this case should be followed by 
a generally public interest-friendlier approach that rather uses (extensive) conditions 
than completely prohibiting a merger. Remedies are often suitable to neutralize 
competition concerns while maintaining the positive public interest influences. It is then 
in the hands of the parties if they nonetheless want to implement the merger in 
fulfilment of the conditions imposed. It could create an environment that encourages 
parties to make an application for Ministerial authorisation where there are substantial 
reasons. This would help to modernize the German merger review system as public 
interest influences become more and more important, not only in developing countries. 
E. Final Conclusion 
After examining and comparing both systems and their implementation with regard to 
public interest influences it can be concluded that there are similarities in terms of 
public interest factors that are considered and problems that arise from the inclusion of 
these factors in the merger control system.  
The broad terms terms in § 42 ARC are open for a wide range of public interest 
concerns to be raised (cf E.ON/Ruhrgas) yet the most prominent and important is job 
retention as it can be seen in the controversial EDEKA/Tengelmann case. 
South Africa follows a more open approach with an enumerated list of public interest 
grounds which only in parts deviate from those in the center of discussion in Germany. 
A significant contrast to Germany is that mergers harmless to competition can be 
prohibited on public interest grounds. Employment is the predominant ground evoked 
by the parties. The state-specific concern of bringing disadvantaged people in the 
economy has to be handled with greatest caution in order not to contradict its 
fundamental aims.  
Both competition regimes face the task of balancing competition and public interest 
effects. In Germany, proportionality is already required by the GG and reflected in the 
German case law as the central question of § 42 ARC. In detail, it finds its expression in 
the burden of proof, especially regarding merger specificity, and other balancing 
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deliberations. A comprehensible appropriateness test in terms of balancing can be 
approached through the use of rules of thumb provided by the casuistry (in South Africa 
summarized in the Guidelines) and due orientation towards economic factors and 
improving economic models as a starting point. In both merger control regimes it can be 
expected that economists will play an increasingly important role where a balancing 
task requires to especially weigh the economic outcomes of an intended merger. But in 
the end, it remains a policy decision for which the competent authority has a certain 
margin of assessment.   
However, both countries are at different stages of their development and have 
implemented systems that lead to different levels of public interest inclusion. The 
general systematic and orientation of the merger review meet the needs of the countries’ 
and competition authorities’ stage of development and are consistent with the 
subsequent different approaches towards public interest influences in South Africa and 
Germany. The differing systematic, with South Africa putting more emphasis on the 
inclusion of public interest factors is rooted in the history of the country and due to its 
current stage of development. 
At first, the South African approach appears to be an advanced pro-public interest 
model of the German system. But this view would ignore the policy decision behind the 
German model intentionally restricting public interest considerations through a formal 
application requirement. It includes the regulative declaration that competition findings 
should only exceptionally be revised on public interest grounds. At this time, a general 
change in the merger control policy to a more public interest friendly approach (based 
on the South African model) that would be associated with a higher complexity and 
opacity of the decisions combining both aspects does not appear advisable. The current 
state of the German economy and society does not trigger the urgent need for a broader 
inclusion of public interest factors. 
On the other hand, the South African system is needed to fight the inequalities of the 
past. At the same time, it has the potential to make merger cases more complex and 
requires more resources. Therefore, it is important to adjust the capacities of the 
authorities in-charged to the possible workload before them. 
Against this backdrop, the single- respectively two-body approach should also not be 
transferred to the other country. Firstly, it is fitted to the system and the resulting 
number of cases. Secondly, it is customized to the prevailing goals of the respective 
merger control system, which are particularly the standing of the competition authority 
in the population and society and a transparent control for South Africa and the 
unaffected independence of the BKartA in Germany.  
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement in both jurisdictions. In Germany, due to a 





beginning, a focus on economic policy and a predefined relationship of rules and 
exception that binds the Minister, he has remained a very cautious approach towards 
public interest concerns. Knowing this, parties seldom apply for ministerial approval of 
a merger. In order to exploit the full potential for the inclusion of public interest 
influences that are beneficial for all sides, the EDEKA/Tengelmann298 case should be 
the starting point of an increasing consideration of remedies in Germany. After Wal-
Mart/Massmart, the South African authorities should be even more confident and 
willing to enforce the ambitious goals of the Competition Act.   
As a general conclusion, one always needs to be aware that the different approaches and 
outcomes are a sign for the fact that the answers to public interest questions immensely 
depend on the character of the particular economy.299 
Through its unique features, ‘South African competition law is on the cutting edge of 
new developments’.300 It will be pivotal how s 12 A(3) will be implemented in the 
future - not only for South Africa’s development. If the competent competition 
authorities are able to demonstrate the benefits of an inclusion of the public interest test 
in the merger analysis, South Africa can become a role model for other jurisdictions 
with existing or newly developing merger control systems. But as I already stressed 
above, the competition law regimes need to be tailored to the needs of the realities in the 
respective jurisdiction. Germany, with a strong economy and low unemployment 
rates301, does not have the incentive to include public interest factors to the same extent 
as South Africa. It can put more focus on the stabilization and independence of the 
BKartA. South Africa‘s pioneering role will therefore potentially be more influential for 
states that deal with similar or parallel socio-economic problems.   
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